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A NEW IMAGE OF THE SLAVE AUCTION: AN
EMPIRICAL LOOK AT THE ROLE OF LAW
IN SLAVE SALES AND A CONCEPTUAL
REEVALUATION OF SLAVE
PROPERTY*
Thomas D. Russell**

The slave auction is among the most powerful images in the
history of the United States. Depictions of slave auctions vary, but
of the recurring compositional elements, the most fearful and moving is the separation by sale of a young child from his or her
mother. The slave auction image starkly represents the inhumanity
of American slavery, the racism of the United States, and the contradictions of American liberalism.

The auction was an important icon in Southern society during
slavery times. James Oakes, a participant in this Symposium, has
argued that "[a]uctions were so much a part of slavery, they
evinced such distinct patterns, that we may speak of them as having
become ritualized."' In his 1990 book Slavery and Freedom, Oakes
analyzed the auction rituals as "ceremonies of degradation, symbolic reenactments of the violence of original enslavement, potent
reminders of the slave's powerlessness and dishonor."2 As such,
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1 JAMES OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD SOUTH

23 (1990) [hereinafter OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM]. See James Oakes, "The Compromising Expedient": Justifying a Proslavery Constitution, 17 CARDOZO L. REV. 2023 (1996)
(Symposium article).
2 OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 24.
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the slave auction reinforced the subordinate position of slaves in
Southern society.
During the antebellum period, the slave auction image was familiar as an antislavery icon. The most important popularizer of
the image was Harriet Beecher Stowe. 3 Stowe first published Uncle Tom's Cabin in installments that appeared over a ten month
period beginning in June 1851 in an antislavery journal called The
National Era. The work appeared in book form in March of 1852
and sold 300,000 copies by the end of the year-roughly one for
every eight northern families.4 In the twelfth of the work's fortyfive chapters-titled Select Incident of Lawful Trade-Stowe first

described the auction sale of slaves. The central dramatic tension
of the chapter was the separation of a slave mother from her fourteen year-old son, whom Stowe described as "the only survivor of a
large family, who had been successively sold away from her to a
southern market."5 Family disruption is, of course, a prominent
theme of Stowe's novel.6
In his 1995 book Self-Rule, Robert Wiebe identified a standardized description of slave auctions that European visitors offered in written accounts of their travels to the United States.7
Wiebe explained that a series of Europeans visited between 1815
and 1860 to investigate self-rule in America. Collectively, these
travelers constructed a portrait of American culture as workaholic,
anti-authoritarian, ill-mannered, insubstantial, filthy, violent, and
overly individualized. 8 "[B]y decivilizing American democracy[,]"
3 HARRIET BEECHER STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN; OR, LIFE AMONG THE LOWLY

(Cleveland, John P. Jewett & Co. 1852) [hereinafter STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN]. Also

important

was THEODORE

D.

WELD, AMERICAN SLAVERY As IT Is: TESTIMONY OF A

THOUSAND WITNESSES 167, 174 (Arno Press, 1968) (1839).

See generally MORTIMER

THOMSON, WHAT BECAME OF THE SLAVES ON A GEORGIA PLANTATION? GREAT AUCTION SALE OF SLAVES, AT SAVANNAH, GEORGIA, MARCH 2D & 3D, 1859 (1863); JOHN T.
KRAMER, THE SLAVE-AUCtION (Boston, Robert F. Wallcut 1859); GEORGE W. CARLE-

TON, THE SUPPRESSED BOOK ABOUT SLAVERY! (New York, Arno Press & The New York

Times 1968) (1864).
4 See GEORGE M.

FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914, at 110 (Wesleyan Uni-

versity Press 1987) (1971); Russell B. Nye, Introduction to HARRIEr BEECHER STOWE,
UNCLE TOM'S CABIN, at x (Washington Square Press 1963) (1852); ROBERT W. FOGEL,
WITHOUT CONSENT OR CONTRACT: THE RISE AND FALL OF AMERICAN SLAVERY 342

(1989).
5 STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN, supra note 3, at 172-194.
6 See JAMES OAKES, THE RULING RACE: A HISTORY OF AMERICAN SLAVEHOLDERS
195 (1982) [hereinafter OAKES, THE RULING RACE].
7 ROBERT H. WIEBE, SELF-RULE: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

(1995).
8 Id. at 44, 45-46, 48-49, 51.
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Wiebe concluded, European visitors were able to "quarantine" and
"isolate democratic America" as savage or barbarous, that is, as
not European.9 To these European visitors, said Wiebe, "slavery
was the ultimate violence, proof positive of democracy's savagery."' 10 The standardized European slave auction narrative had
four aspects: "the stunned traveler's revelation that a human being
would actually be sold[,]" the degradation of the individual being
sold, the contrast between the slaves' pitiable situation and the remorseless indifference of the whites, and finally, the traveler's
flight from the unbeatable scene." Like Oakes, Wiebe analyzed
the standard European account of the slave auction as a "formalized story" with "many, complicated messages.' 2 These messages
included concerns about "runaway commercial capitalism ....
emotions about physical contact and personal violation-specifically, in the American context, their revulsion at crowding, pawing
democrats[,]" and, of course, "powerful feelings about the horrors
of slavery itself."' 3
Today, the advertising of history books attests to the continuing potency of'the slave auction image. For example, the dustcover
of Peter Kolchin's 1993 book American Slavery features a drawing
of a slave auction.' 4 In the center of this drawing, an auctioneer
holds a tiny slave baby aloft while the mother pleads from her
knees With her hands clasped together. Similarly, the editor of The
New York Times Book Review demonstrated the continuing power
of the image by reproducing a drawing of a slave auction, taken
from London's Illustrated News, in Pauline Maier's review of
Kolchin's book.' 5 That drawing depicts a slave man with a slave
woman and slave child standing on an auction block as the auctioneer cries bids to a room of men.
The advertisement for Slavery, the Civil Law, and the Supreme
Court of Louisiana, a new book by Symposium participant Judith

9

Id. at 47. See also id. at 52, 54.

10 Id. at 52.
11 Id.:
12
13

Id. at 53.
Id.

14 PETER KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, 1619-1877 (1993). The paperback reproduces this image on its front cover. Kolchin is a participant in this Symposium. See Peter
Kolchin, Comment on the First Slave (and Why He Matters) By Jonathan Bush, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 631 (1996) (Symposium article).
15 Pauline Maier, A Marketplace of Human Souls, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Sept. 5,
1993, at 9-10.
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Schafer, also includes a depiction of a slave auction. 16 The drawing
used in the advertisement first appeared in James Silk Buckingham's 1842 book The Slave States of America.'7 Nine decades
later, American historian Frederick Bancroft reproduced the same
drawing in his book Slave-Trading in the Old South. 8 The image

used by Buckingham, Bancroft, and now Schafer depicts three auction sales simultaneously taking place in the French Exchange, beneath the rotunda of the St. Louis Hotel in New Orleans. Of the
encanteurs-the Creole term for the bilingual auctioneers of antebellum New Orleans-Bancroft wrote that they "never felt more
important than when selling slaves, and for the encanteur there was
no place like la Bourse de l'Hotel St. Louis d midi .... ."19 One of

the three sales depicted in the French Exchange drawing is a slave
auction, with the encanteur standing behind a podium, his hammer
ready to fall. Four slaves stand before the encanteur-a man

stands to the right of the encanteur, on the left a woman with a
young child, and a child sits in front of the podium. The composition suggests that the sale would separate a husband from his wife
and their children. The drawing stops short of depicting the sepa-

ration of the children from their mother, perhaps because such separations would have been illegal in Louisiana at the time.2"
As part of this Symposium, which takes as its subject the new
slavery scholarship and its impact on law and legal historiography,

I offer a new image of the slave auction. My first goal is to send
participants in this Symposium and readers of this piece away with
16 JUDITH

K.

SCHAFER, SLAVERY, THE CIVIL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUI-

SIANA 22 (1994) [hereinafter SCHAFER, SLAVERY, THE CIVIL LAW, AND THE SUPREME
COURT OF LOUISIANA]. See Judith K. Schafer, "Under the PresentMode of Trial, Improper

Verdicts are Very Often Given": Criminal Procedurein the Trials of Slaves in Antebellum
Louisiana, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 635 (1996).
17 1 JAMES S. BUCKINGHAM, THE SLAVE STATES OF AMERICA 332-35 (London, Fisher,
Son, & Co. 1842). The drawing appears opposite of page 334 as an unnumbered page.
18 FREDERIC K. BANCROFT, SLAVE-TRADING IN THE OLD SOUTH (1931).
19 Id. at 335.
20 Id. at 197-98; see L. MOREAU LISLET, DIGESTE GENERAL DES ACRES DE LA LGISLATURE DE LA LOUISIANE 221 (New Orleans, Benjamin Levy 1828) (Code Noir, sec. 9,221
(Approved June 7, 1806)) ("I1 est absolument d6fendu A tout particulier de vendre, sdpardment de leur mare, les enfans qui n'auront pas dix ans rdvolus."). Alabama and Georgia
placed some statutory limitation on the separation of families at court-supervised sales, but
the effect of these laws is unknown. See THOMAS D. MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND
THE LAW, 1619-1860, at 83 (1996) [hereinafter MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE
LAW]; ANDREW FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS: AN INTERPRETATION OF THE FUNDAMENTALS OF THE LAW OF SLAVERY IN THE U.S. SOUTH 231-33 (1992) [hereinafter FEDE,
PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS]; and Thomas D. Russell, Articles Sell Best Singly: The Disruption of Slave Familiesat Court Sales, 1996 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Rus-

sell, Articles Sell Best Singly].
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the new image in their heads. This new image of the slave auction
incorporates law into the iconography that antebellum
Southerners, abolitionists, European visitors, historians, and advertisers have developed. The new image gives legal institutions a visible and prominent role in constituting and ordering slave auctions.
Today, the predominant view of the slave auction seems to be of
commercial sale-usually in New Orleans or Charleston, sometimes Richmond. I replace this view with a scene in which the
slave auction takes place on the steps of a courthouse with a legal
official-typically the sheriff-directing the sale and perhaps serving as auctioneer.
The remainder of this paper consists of four sections. Part I is
a brief overview of empirical data supporting my claim that courts
and agents of law should be included in representations of slave
auctions. These data, drawn from antebellum South Carolina,
show that courts conducted or supervised one-half of the state's
slave auctions during the four decades that preceded the Civil War.
This section includes a brief review of some historical scholarship
regarding court sales of slaves. The section also mentions the procedural and transactional background of judicial sales and, finally,
suggests that the risk of family fragmentation was substantially
higher at judicial sales as compared with commercial sales.
The empirical data and the new image of the slave auction
place law at the center of the business of slave selling. The dehumanization and subordination of the slave auction had direct support from legal officials and institutions. Judges, for example, were
not merely complicit bystanders in the institution of slavery. Instead, they occupied managerial roles.21 Legal officials enacted the
ceremonial degradation and ritualized violence that Oakes identified as "potent reminders of the slave's powerlessness and dishonor. ' 22 And law staged sales about which Europeans
constructed standardized narratives that they used to isolate Americans and their self-rule as decivilized and barbarous. As well, of
course, the force of law supported the most searing of the elements
of the auction image: the separation of children from their
mothers. As managers of slave auctions, judges and other legal officials participated in a process by which some of slavery's more
drastic results came to be seen as legitimate. By their participation,
21 Compare ROBERT M.
PROCESS, at xi (1975).

COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL

22 OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM,

supra note 1, at 24.
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legal officials both strengthened and legitimized the institution of
slavery.
The empirical first section secures the new image of the slave
auction. In Part II, I take seriously this Symposium's focus on historiography and I make a historiographical argument. That is, I
make an argument regarding the existing historical literature. I
take issue with how historians of slavery-most of whom are participants in this Symposium-have written about slave property. I
argue that among historians the dominant conception of the nature
of property in slaves has been an absolute or nearly absolute one in
which a single person dominated totally or nearly totally the lives
of those slaves held as his or her property.
In Part III, I argue that historians should not conceive of property in slaves as absolute (or even nearly absolute) and unified in
the hands of one person. I suggest a different model of property,
one that I believe historians should substitute for the dominant
conception. Historians should understand property in slaves as
consisting of a variety of legal entitlements divided among a
number of different persons. This new model, I argue, better represents the manner in which antebellum Southerners held property
in slaves, as for each slave there might have been a number of different non-slaves who held some property interest in that slave. I
also believe that both this model of property and also the way that
Southerners held slave property fit with broader patterns of property holding in the United States at the time.
Writing for an audience from two disciplines is rewarding but
sometimes difficult because the two disciplines bring to bear very
different underlying assumptions and bodies of knowledge. Historical readers of drafts of this piece have suggested that I devote too
much effort to explaining how historians have thought about property in slaves. They think that everyone knows how historians have
thought about the question. I make this explanation-a justification for some extended historiographical discussions-because
legal scholars who have read earlier drafts thought that no one
could possibly think about property the way historians have, and
that one of my starting premises must therefore be mistaken. I
hope in this article to move the two disciplines of law and history
toward common ground concerning property in slaves-to give the
historians a more sophisticated understanding of the law of property and to give lawyers a more sophisticated understanding of the
historiography of slavery.
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For the most part, the evidence that I marshal in Part III in
support of the new model of property is evidence that is already
well-known to historians of slavery. I simply aggregate existing historical evidence regarding the varied forms of slave property and
argue that these different pieces of evidence are not exceptional.
Instead, taken together, they were the normal expression of property in slaves. Put differently, I believe that what historians have
said about slave property has been in conflict with the very evidence they have offered. In their writings, historians have tended
to describe slave property as absolute or nearly absolute and as
unified in the hands of one person. However, historians have also
offered evidence of ways in which property interests in slaves were
fragmented. I argue that historians should rethink or re-envision
their idea of property in slaves in light of evidence with which they
are already familiar. The evidence already exists; historians need
only transform how they sift that evidence.
Viewed conceptually, slave property was not just a relationship between one individual and a slave-this, I argue, is how historians have tended to think of slave property. Instead, slave
property was also the legal relationship among a number of nonslave individuals. These legal relationships the non-slaves articulated through the slave, the object of property.23 As property, a
slave joined together all those persons who held legal entitlements
in him or her.
Auctions represented perfectly the relational nature of property in slaves. This was another reason for the auction's symbolic
importance in Southern society. These public sales took place
before a number of spectators and bidders. The persons who
viewed the sales and participated in the bidding were, of course,
interested in the sales as events or spectacles and also as opportunities to purchase. But the spectators and viewers might also be interested-in the legal sense-in the outcome of the auctions, as the
sales reconfigured existing property interests in the slaves being
sold. With each sale, new constellations of persons holding property interests formed. Sometimes, sales enabled new persons to
enter the ranks of those who held property interests in slaves. Auctions were social events, more so than private sales between individuals. Considered conceptually, slave auctions were one of the
mechanisms by which Southerners distributed and shared their
23

See

PATRICIA J. WILLIAMS,

RACE AND RIGHTS

216 (1991).

On Being the Object of Property, in

THE ALCHEMY OF
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stake in slavery. Slave property, as a social relationship, was an
expression of that distributed commitment to the institution.
I.

EMPIRICAL DETAILS OF THE ROLE OF LAW
IN SLAVE SALES

In antebellum South Carolina, courts ordered or supervised
one-half of all the state's slave sales in the four decades preceding
the Civil War. 24 Because all court sales were auction sales and not
all non-court sales were by auction, court sales comprised a majority of all of South Carolina's slave auctions. Whether other states
followed a pattern similar to South Carolina's is presently impossible to say with certainty. There is, however, no reason to think that
any state would have differed substantially. Even in Louisiana,
with its legal system based on the Napoleonic Code, court sales of
slaves appear to have been frequent.
In arguing that court sales comprised one-half of South Caro-

lina's antebellum slave sales, I do not, of course, claim to be the
first historian to have noticed court sales of slaves. Historians have
known that courts conducted sales of slaves for a long time. The
earliest example that I have encountered of a historian commenting on the frequency of court sales of slaves is Bryan Edwards's
1794 History of the British Colonies in the West Indies, in which he
lamented the seizure and sale of West Indian slaves in order to
satisfy the debts of slaveholders and suggested that the British Parliament should disallow the practice. 26 No doubt there are earlier
examples, perhaps stretching back to ancient history.
More recently, Kenneth Stampp also discussed court sales of
slaves in his fine, now forty-year-old book, The Peculiar Institu24 This section includes arguments that I have presented at greater length elsewhere.
See Thomas D. Russell, South Carolina's Largest Slave Auctioneering Firm, 68 CHI.-KENT
L. REV. 1241 (1993); Thomas D. Russell, Slave Auctions on the Courthouse Steps: Court
Sales of Slaves in Antebellum South Carolina, in THE LAW OF SLAVERY, (Paul Finkelman

ed., forthcoming 1997); Thomas D. Russell, Sale Day in Antebellum South Carolina: Slavery, Law, Economy, and Court-Supervised Sales (1993) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Stanford University) (A copy of which is on file with the author.). The conclusions of this
section are based upon analysis of data drawn from about 2,100 sales between 1823 and
1865. These data are drawn from the manuscript record books of the legal officials who
conducted the sales in five different South Carolina districts. See Russell, South Carolina's
Largest Slave Auctioneering Firm, supra, at 1247.
25 SCHAFER, SLAVERY, THE CIVIL LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA,

supra note 16, at 168, 170-71.
26 2 BRYAN EDWARDS, THE HISTORY, CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL, OF THE BRITISH COLONIES IN THE WEST INDIES 153-54 (2d ed. 1794) (1793).
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tion. 27 Stampp, an honored participant in this Symposium, 28 knew

in 1959 that court sales of the types that I will describe below occurred. He was, for example, quite familiar with the sales that executors and administrators conducted; below, I will refer to these
sales as probate sales. He discussed sales by executors and noted
that these sales broke up families. 29 Like any historian who has
looked at nineteenth-century newspapers, Stampp noticed that
"[a]dvertisements of administrators' sales appeared constantly in
southern newspapers. "30 As well, Stampp knew that slave sales by
executors and administrators took place in order to settle the debts
of decedents' estates.3' Stampp was also familiar with sheriffs'
sales, another type of sale that I will discuss below. He noted, for
example, that "[s]ince slaves were frequently sold on credit or used
as security for loans, 32they were subject to seizure and sale for the
benefit of creditors.

Stampp was thus familiar with probate and sheriffs' sales. As
between the two, he emphasized the occurrence of probate sales
more than sheriffs' sales. It is safe to say, however, that Stampp
did not view court sales as coming close to comprising one-half of
all slave sales. Stampp, in his discussion of court sales, conveys the
impression that they were a small fraction of all slave sales. The
closest that Stampp comes to giving an estimate of the frequency of
such sales is his remark that administrators' advertisements appeared "constantly" in the newspapers and that "slaves were frequently sold on credit or used as security[,]" which made them
"subject to seizure and sale for the benefit of creditors.

' 33

Stampp

made no effort to quantify the extent of "constantly." Neither did
he suggest what proportion of the "frequent" sales on credit resulted in default and then sheriff's sale of the debtor's slaves.
Stampp's failure to quantify the frequency of these events and
transactions, I hasten to point out, is not a flaw of The Peculiar
Institution. After all, he was writing in the 1950s, well before many
historians at all had adopted quantitative methods that might have
lent more precision to his estimates.
27 KENNETH

M.

STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION:

SLAVERY IN THE ANTE-BEL-

LUM SOUTH (1956) [hereinafter STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION].
28 Kenneth M. Stampp, Comment on Earl Maltz, 17 CARDOZO

L. REV. 2017 (1996).
Stampp received the Telford Taylor Public Service award at this Symposium.
29 STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 199. See also id. at 200, 345, 348.
30 Id. at 199. See also id. at 200-01 (discussing other sales by administrators or
executors).
31 Id. at 201, 203, 241, 333, 345, 348.
32 Id. at 200. See also id. at 203, 252, 333, 348.
33 Id. at 200.
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Although Stampp knew about court sales of slaves, he did not
treat them as constituting a considerable portion of all slave sales.
Even so, I believe that Stampp gave court sales more emphasis
than subsequent historians. In the four decades since Stampp published The PeculiarInstitution, historians have forgotten many of
his lessons. This was especially true during the 1970s, tumultuous
years not only for social protest but also for social history, including the social history of slavery. To my mind, two books on slavery
stand out, both of which appeared in 1974. The first is Robert
Fogel and Stanley Engerman's Time on the Cross,34 and the second
is Eugene Genovese's Roll, Jordan, Roll.35 I will use these two
books as examples to demonstrate that since 1956, when Stampp's
book was published, historians of slavery have either forgotten or
moved away from some of Stampp's lessons.
As all historians of slavery and most scholars know, Fogel and
Engerman's Time on the Cross unleashed a storm of protest, both
against its conclusions and also against its quantitative methods.36
With regard to court.sales, Fogel and Engerman provide an important example of the movement away from Stampp's findings. I regard them as historians who recognized but minimized the
importance of court sales.37 When they wrote Time on the Cross,
there existed only one quantitative study of the volume of slave
sales, which dealt with one county in Maryland. Fogel and Engerman examined this study and concluded that the death of slaveholders likely precipitated about half of all slave sales, but this did
not lead them to examine what role, if any, courts played in those
death-related sales. That is, they largely ignored the role of the
courts. And they explicitly minimized the importance of sheriffs'
sales, the other type of court sale that Stampp discussed. Concerning sheriffs' sales, Fogel. and Engerman guessed that "since the
bankruptcy rate was quite low in agriculture, it is unlikely that dis38
tressed sales accountedfor more than a small fraction of the total."
As I will note below, my South Carolina data indicate that sheriffs'
sales exceeded probate sales in numbers of slaves sold. Thus,
34 ROBERT W. FOGEL & STANLEY L. ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS: THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY (1974) [hereinafter FOGEL & ENGERMAN, TIME ON
THE CROSS].
35 EUGENE D. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL: THE WORLD THE SLAVES MADE
(1974) [hereinafter GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL].
36 See PETER J.PARISH, SLAVERY: HISTORY AND HISTORIANS 32-41 (1989) [hereinafter
PARISH, SLAVERY].
37 See Russell, South

Carolina's Largest Slave Auctioneering Firm, supra note 24, at

1244 n.8.
38 FOGEL

&

ENGERMAN, TIME ON THE CROSS,

supra note 34, at 55 (emphasis added).
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although Stampp placed some emphasis on both probate and sheriffs' sales, Fogel and Engerman, who wrote roughly two decades

after Stampp, minimized the importance of these types of sales. I
believe that Fogel and Engerman's failure to recognize the importance of sheriffs' sales may be partly a consequence of the records
they consulted.39 I also believe that they tended to disregard court
sales because of the strength of their commitment to showing the

rationality of slavery as an economic institution. Court sales, since
they did not take place under the circumstances of a "free market,"
would have fit uneasily within their scheme.
Genovese's Roll, Jordan, Roll, the second of the important
1974 books on slavery, ignored court sales. Roll, Jordan,Roll has
displaced Stampp's The PeculiarInstitution and become the most
widely used history of American slavery.40 Where Fogel and Engerman had boldly minimized the importance of types of court
sales, Genovese simply ignored them. In the index to Roll, Jordan,
Roll, Genovese has thirteen page references to the slave trade, but

in none of these places does Genovese refer to court sales.4 Of
the four page references to auctions, none is a judicial sale of

slaves.42 Genovese ignored court sales for a reason different than

Fogel and Engerman. Genovese is among those historians, whom I
will describe at greater length in Part II, who emphasize the total

relationship of the master and slave. Recognizing the importance
39 They used records of bills of sale, in which sheriffs' sales are underrepresented. See
Russell, Articles Sell Best Singly, supra note 20.
40 Parish wrote that
if one historian has a claim to be regarded as the dominant, if seldom uncontroversial, influence during the last twenty years at least, it is surely Eugene
Genovese ....
Despite its considerable bulk, it remains, among all the major
works on the subject, the most popular with students, whether or not they sympathize with the author's ideological standpoint.
PARISH, SLAVERY, supra note 36, at 170. See also STANLEY M. ELKINS, SLAVERY: A PROBLEM IN AMERICAN INSTITUTIONAL AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE 289 (3d ed. rev. 1976) (1959)
[hereinafter ELKINS, SLAVERY] ("Roll, Jordan, Roll, with its magisterial proportions, may
well come to occupy the authoritative position once held by Ulrich Phillips' American Negro Slavery and later by Kenneth Stampp's The PeculiarInstitution.").
41 GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL, supra note 35, at 4, 5, 54, 171, 176, 332, 372, 390,
416-17, 449, 453, 471, 625.
42 Id. at 332, 390, 453, 471. However, Genovese once mentions that "authorities"
sometimes hired out slaves following bankruptcies. Id. at 391. The same pattern is true in
one of Genovese's earlier works, The Political Economy of Slavery, which was first published in 1965-nine years after Stampp's The Peculiar Institution. Genovese's index to
The PoliticalEconomy of Slavery includes nine page references to "Slaves, sale of." Again,
none of these sales was a court sale, and with many of the sales, Genovese stresses that the
slave seller was voluntarily selling or liquidating his assets. EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SLAVERY: STUDIES IN THE ECONOMY & SOCIETY OF THE SLAVE

SOUTH 27, 90, 99, 125, 136-45, 149, 150-52, 180, 247 (2d ed. 1989).
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of court sales would be an admission that the relationship of master
to slave was less hermetic than Genovese and other historians
would like to believe.
Genovese has thus played an important role in minimizing the
attention focused on court sales of slaves. Stampp recognized forty
years ago that courts played a role in slave sales, but he did not
know just how large and important a role the courts played. Fogel
and Engerman explicitly minimized the importance of certain types
of judicial sales. Genovese, by contrast, simply ignored the role of
the courts in selling slaves. Thus, as Genovese supplanted Stampp,
the attention directed toward court sales of slaves has diminished.
With my work, I have tried to refocus attention on court sales, returning to and then building upon the insights that Stampp offered
in The PeculiarInstitution. I have "shown that we have too often
43
overlooked the role of the courts.
Returning to the South Carolina data, court sales of slaves
were auctions that took place on the steps of the courthouses of
South Carolina's different districts, as counties were then known."
The court sales usually took place on the first Monday of every
month, a day that statute defined as Sale Day. Sale Day was an
important social occasion. Farmers left their fields, planters came
from their plantations, and crowds gathered before the courthouses
of each district to watch and participate in the spectacle of property
sales. This was the most likely day to find everyone in town, particularly when the property to be sold included numbers of slaves. 5
The legal officials who conducted sales included sheriffs, masters in chancery, and probate court officials.46 Sales usually took
place for reasons of debt or death, often both together. Most important were sheriffs' sales, which accounted for 45% of all court
sales of slaves. Once again, Fogel and Engerman were wrong to
minimize the incidence of sheriffs' sales. After sheriffs' sales, the
next largest fraction were probate sales, which accounted for 40%.
The remaining 15% were sales that equity courts ordered.47 In all,
0.85% of South Carolina's slave population was sold at court sales
each year. This figure may seem small, but 0.85% is one-half of the
43 MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW,

supra note 20, at 103.
On Virginia sales of slaves at the courthouse, see STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION,
supra note 27, at 200.
45 Russell, Sale Day in Antebellum South Carolina, supra note 24, at 87-102.
46 See Russell, South Carolina's Largest Slave Auctioneering Firm, supra note 24, at
1247.
47 See id. at 1266-67.
44
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best current estimates for the total volume of slave sales in South
Carolina. 8
Sheriffs' sales, the largest category of sales, usually resulted

from credit transactions. Slaves were the most important assets of
the Southern economy. Roger Ransom and Richard Sutch have
estimated that in the major cotton-growing states, slaves represented 44% of all wealth, with real estate amounting to only about

25% of the total wealth. 49 Given their importance as assets, it
should be no surprise that slaves often formed the basis on which
creditors extended credit. In his recent book, Debt, Investment,
Slaves, Richard Kilbourne demonstrated that "[s]laves accounted

for most of the collateral for both short-term and long-term credit
arrangements in antebellum East Feliciana Parish, [Louisiana]. 50
In South Carolina and other common law states, slaves also formed
the basis on which creditors extended credit.5 1 When debtors
failed to repay their creditors, sheriffs' sales were the final step in
these credit transactions. Courts were thus at the center of the
business of slave selling and also vitally important to credit
transactions. 2
Probate sales of slaves took place following the death of a
slaveholder. In Uncle Tom's Cabin, the first auction sale that
Stowe described was not a commercial sale but was instead .a sale
by an executor of a decedent's estate. 3 Often probate sales were
necessary to pay off the debts of the estate or to divide the estate

among the heirs.54 Equity court sales were also occasioned by debt
48 See id. at 1271.

49 See Roger Ransom & Richard Sutch, Capitalists Without Capital: The Burden of
Slavery and the Impact of Emancipation,62 AGRIC. HIST. 133, 138-39 (1988). Jaynes places
this figure at 45.8%. See GERALD D. JAYNES, BRANCHES WITHOUT ROOTS: GENESIS OF
THE BLACK WORKING CLASS IN THE AMERICAN SOUTH, 1862-1882, at 35 (1986).
50 RICHARD H. KILBOURNE, JR., DEBT, INVESTMENT, SLAVES: CREDIT RELATIONS IN.
EAST FELICIANA PARISH, LOUISIANA 1825-1885, at 49 (1995).
51 See MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, supra

note 20, at 121-31, 388-392
Kenneth Stampp notes that "slaves were frequently sold on credit or used as security for
loans." STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 200. See also Thomas D. Russell, The Antebellum Courthouseas Creditors'Domain: Trial-CourtActivity in South Carolina and the Concomitance of Lending and Litigation, AM. J. LEGAL HIST. (forthcoming
1997).
52 KILBOURNE, DEBT, INVESTMENT, SLAVES, supra note 50, at 49-74.
53 STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN, supra note 3, at 172-194.
54 STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 201; James W. McGettigan, Jr.,
Boone County Slaves: Sales, Estate Divisionsand Families, 1820-1865, Part I, 72 Mo. HIST.
REV. 176, 186-87 (Jan. 1978); James W. McGettigan, Jr., Boone County Slaves: Sales, Estate
Divisions and Families, 1820-1865, Part I, 72 Mo. HIST. REV. 271, 283-85, 290-91 (Apr.
1978); OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 9-10, 22-23.
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or death.55 In addition, the foreclosure of mortgages took place in
South Carolina's equity courts. Foreclosure was a process technically different from the execution of liens, which led to sheriffs'
sales and were a matter for the common-law courts.56
Considered together, South Carolina's courts operated as a
great auctioneering firm. The various agents of the courts drew
profits from the sales of slaves in the form of commissions, just as
commission-merchants did.5 7 And the volume of sales could be
quite substantial. In one South Carolina district, for example, the
sheriff's sales of slaves, real estate, houses, and personal property
amounted to gross sales of more than $127,000 during 1845 and
1846, drought years during
which South Carolina's agriculturalists
58
were greatly distressed.
For slaves, the risk of family separation was higher at court
sales than at commercial sales. 59 When courts conducted slave
sales, separating husbands from their wives and mothers and fathers from their children was easier and more common than at
commercial sales. At South Carolina court sales, more than half of
the slaves were offered for individual sale. This meant that the
sheriff or other legal official sold the slave alone, rather than as
part of a group. Obviously, individual sale heightened the risk of
separation from family. Calculation of a precise figure for the risk
of family disruption is very difficult. I estimate that slaves sold at
court sales faced a risk of separation from their families that was
60
from two to three times higher than at local, commercial sales.
Court officials, at the center of slave sales, played a direct role in
the destruction of slave families.
, Courts, sheriffs, and other agents of legal institutions should
be included when we envision the slave auction. Courts ordered or
supervised one-half of South Carolina's slave sales, and at these
sales, the risk of family separation-the most powerful of the slave
auction image's recurring elements-was substantially greater as
compared with commercial sales. The new image of the slave auction, then, is an auction that a legal official conducted on the steps
55 See Russell, South Carolina's Largest Slave Auctioneering Firm, supra note 24, at

1264.
56

See id. at 1263.

57 See id at 1273.
58

See id. at 1253.

59 The details in this paragraph come from Russell, Articles Sell Best Singly, supra note
20.
60 See id
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of the courthouse with the gathered community bidding and
watching.
II.

HISTORIANS' CONCEPTIONS OF SLAVE PROPERTY

The slave auction image derives its power from the moral
problem that Harriet Beecher Stowe expressed in the original subtitle of Uncle Tom's Cabin; this subtitle was The Man that Was a
Thing.61 Like Stowe, historians of slavery have fastened upon the
dichotomy of person and property as a concise expression of the
moral problem of slavery. In The Problem of Slavery in Western
Culture, David Brion Davis demonstrated that "in Western Culture
[slavery] had long represented the ultimate limit of dehumanization, of treating and regarding a man as a thing. ' 62 Likewise, in
The PeculiarInstitution, Stampp referred to the "dual character of
the slave" in the first sentence of a chapter entitled Chattels Personal.63 Antebellum legislators, magistrates, and masters were
caught in or struggling with the dilemma of person versus property,
according to Stampp. He observed that because of the impossibility of resolving the dilemma, "[b]oth legislators and judges frequently appeared erratic in dealing with bondsmen as both things
and persons."' More recently, in a 1989 article entitled Property
First, Humanity Second, Leon Higginbotham-a participant in this
Symposium-and Barbara Kopytoff used the dichotomy as their
analytic framework when they examined slavery and private law in
Virginia.65
Historians have concluded that property trumped person in
the context of American slavery. Stampp, for example, correctly
noted that when push came to shove, "the slave as property clearly
had priority over the slave as a person."66 As their title-Property
First,Humanity Second-suggests, Higginbotham and Kopytoff reaffirmed Stampp's conclusion. They found that Virginia's legisla61 Nye, Introduction to STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN, supra note 4, at x. The subtitle

for the book form of the novel was Life Among the Lowly.
62 DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN

CULTURE 10

(1966). See

also id. at 13, 25, 27-28. See generally DAVID B. DAVIS, SLAVERY AND HUMAN PROGRESS
(1984); and DAVID B. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN THE AGE OF REVOLUTION

1770-1823 (1975).
63 STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 192.

64 Id. at 193 (emphasis in original).
65 A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. & Barbara K. Kopytoff, Property First, Humanity Second: The Recognition of the Slave's Human Nature in Virginia Civil Law, 50 OHIO ST. L.J.
511 (1989).
66 STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 204.
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tors and judges recognized slave humanity only when doing so did
not impinge on the property rights of the owner.67
Historians have often used the dichotomy of person and prop6
erty, and it has proven quite useful. In the hands of scholars of
slavery, the dichotomy has served well in framing inquiries that
have shown the limited extent to which slaves enjoyed legal recognition of their humanity. The dichotomy highlights the central
moral problem of slavery. However, I believe that scholars' use of
the dichotomy has also yielded some undesirable results. Scholars
have focused most of their efforts on the person half of the dichotomy and in so doing have often ignored and other times distorted
or obscured the precise nature of property in slaves. As legal historians have demonstrated that legal recognition of slave humanity
was minimal, the strength of the opposite side of the dichotomyproperty-has grown. As property has strengthened, historians
have made the mistake of assuming-either implicitly or, sometimes, explicitly-that all or nearly all of the power of property
rested in the hands of one person, the slave owner. As they have
demonstrated the erasure or diminution of the legal personality of
slaves, users of the dichotomy have tended-both intentionally and
inadvertently-to exaggerate the concentration of power in the
hands of the slave master.
Once again, Stampp's PeculiarInstitution serves as a good example. Stampp noted that "[t]hough the slave was ... recognized
as a person, he was legally at the disposal of his master, whose
property right was very nearly absolute. ' 69 After depicting slave
property as "very nearly absolute," Stampp did mention two limitations on the absolute property of the master. One form consisted
of laws protecting the slave's well-being, such as limitations on extreme cruelty or laws against murdering slaves. 7° However,
Higginbotham & Kopytoff, supra note 65, at 514-34.
Fede opens People Without Rights with a very complete and helpful discussion of the
use of the person/property dichotomy by historians of slavery. He discusses all of the authors that I have mentioned here, and then some. FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS, supra
note 20, at 6-9. For other examples, see JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR.,
FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 124 (7th ed. 1994);
KOLCHIN, AMERICAN SLAVERY, supra note 14, at 127; SCHAFER, SLAVERY, THE CIVIL
LAW, AND THE SUPREME COURT OF LOUISIANA, supra note 16, at 1-27; MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 17-57; Ariela Gross, Pandora'sBox: Slave
Character on Trial in the Antebellum Deep South, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 267, 267-72
(1995); PETER W. BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD: FAMILIES, SEX, AND
THE LAW IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 29-30 (1995).
69 STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 197.
70 Id. at 217-24.
67

68
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Stampp noted that these laws had "significant qualifications"; 7'
that convictions of whites for killing slaves were "exceptional";72
that slaves could not testify against whites; 73 and that most white
juries would not convict a white person for an assault on a slave. 74
Stampp also noted another type of restriction on the authority
of masters in regard to their slave property. Following Harry
Scheiber, this second type of restriction might be termed a recognition of "public rights." Public rights, as Scheiber has used the term,
restrict an individual's rights in view of the rights of the public or
"the political community as a collective entity" and serve to justify
the police power. The paradigm example of the use of public
rights to justify the police power is Massachusetts Chief Justice
Lemuel Shaw's opinion in Commonwealth v. Alger, in which Shaw
and his fellow justices upheld a restriction on a property owner's
extension of a wharf into the Boston Harbor. Shaw identified as
a settled principle .. .that every holder of property, however

absolute and unqualified may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it may be so regulated, that it shall
not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an
equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to
the rights of the community.76

In the context of slavery, restrictions on a master's management of
his or her slaves were exercises of the police power and expressions
of public rights. As an example, Stampp noted that "[n]o person,
not even the master, was to teach a slave to read or write, employ
him in setting type in a printing office, or give him books or pamphlets. ' 77 Another example was the requirement that "[flarms and
plantations employing slaves were to be under the supervision of
resident white men, and not left to the sole direction of slave foremen."78 As well, Stampp referred to laws that did not allow slaves
to "beat drums, blow horns, or possess guns."' 79 These police
power restrictions on what masters might allow their slaves to do,
along with laws concerned with the slaves' well-being, diminished
the absolute character of property in slaves, though only slightly.
71 Id. at

219.

Id. at 221.
73 Id. at 222.
74 Id. at 223.
75 Harry N. Scheiber, Public Rights and the Rule of Law in American Legal History, 72
CAL. L. REv. 217, 219-27 (1984).
72

76 Commonwealth v. Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.)
77 STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION, supra note

78
79

Id.
Id.

53, 84-85 (1851) (emphasis added).
27, at 208 (emphasis added).
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The remaining "very nearly absolute" power was consolidated in
the hands of the slave master. Stampp's conception of slave property as one in which the master held nearly all the power of property, excepting small limitations protecting slaves or enforcing
public rights, has been,. I believe, the dominant conception of slave
property for at least the past forty years.
Three years after Stampp published The Peculiar Institution,
Stanley Elkins redoubled the emphasis on the absolute power of
the slave master-including absolute property ,rights-when he
published his very important book Slavery.80 Most participants in
this Symposium will be familiar with the outlines of the last four
decades of slavery historiography; other readers may not be, and a
brief reminder will help to set my argument regarding historians'
characterization of slave property in a broader historiographical
context. In his 1959 book Slavery, Elkins relied on psychological
theory and comparisons to the experience of prisoners of Nazi concentration camps in order to construct a paradigmatic slave type
whom he called Sambo. 81 Elkins argued that American slaves
were deracinated, infantilized casualties of "absolute power in a
closed system."" z Since 1959, historians have reacted against Elkins's claim that the cultureless, childlike Sambo typified American
slavery. As Peter Parish put it in his 1989 historiographical book
Slavery: History and Historians,
one consequence of Elkins's work was to encourage long-overdue recognition of the slave as a person. In the thirty years
since Elkins's book first appeared, historians have discussed not
only the extent to which the slave personality resisted, or succumbed to, the extraordinary stresses of bondage, but the means
by which slaves succeeded in constructing and maintaining a
life-style, a set of values, and a culture which was distinctively
their own.83
Parish correctly noted that "[p]hrases such as 'the slave personality,' 'the slave community,' and 'slave culture' have become part of
the common parlance of the historians' debate."' In the decades
since Elkins published Slavery, Parish explained that "the slave has
emerged, in the work of historians such as Genovese, Gutman, Levine, Blassingame, and many others, as an active participant not
80 ELKINS, SLAVERY,

supra note 40.

81 Id. at 87.
82 Id. at 88.
83 PARISH, SLAVERY, supra note
84

Id. at 8.

36, at 7-8.
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only in the development of his or her own life-style, but in the
overall history of the peculiar institution."85
As Parish suggested, historians have assaulted and disproved
the Elkins thesis largely by recovering evidence of the culture and
agency of the slaves. To a lesser extent, historians have also eroded
the other side of Elkins's thesis: the absolute power of the institution. As Parish noted, Elkins's "concentration camp analogy was8a6
virtual invitation to counterattack, as well as misrepresentation.
By 1971, George Fredrickson, Christopher Lasch, and Roy BryceLaporte succeeded in convincing Elkins to drop the concentration
camp analogy and instead substitute "total institutions" such as
prisons and asyla.87 But I think that the distance between Elkins's
portrait of the infantile Sambo and the rich portrait we have today
of slave life and culture is greater than the distance between Elkins's concentration camp analogy and the less extreme "total institutions." For the most part, the absolute power of the institution
has remained in place.
Elkins, even more than Stampp, emphasized the absolute
character of the slave master's power, and he linked this absolute
power to the nature of property. "From the master's viewpoint,"
Elkins wrote, "slaves had been defined in law as property, and the
master's power over his property must be absolute."88 Elkins's emphasis on absoluteness of the master's property right fit perfectly,
of course, with his thesis. Of the master, he wrote, "[a]bsolute
power for him meant absolute dependency for the slave-the de89
pendency not of the developing child but of the perpetual child."
Like Stampp, Elkins addressed the restrictions that the state
might have imposed upon the absoluteness of the master's property right, but he distinguished himself from Stampp by a more
thoroughgoing denial of importance or effect to these limitations.
First, with regard to slave family relations, Elkins wrote: "[tihat
most ancient and intimate of institutional arrangements, marriage
and family, had long since been destroyed by the law, and the law
85 Id. See GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL, supra note 35; HERBERT G. GUTMAN,
THE BLACK FAMILY IN SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, 1750-1925 (1976); LAWRENCE W. LEVINE, BLACK CULTURE AND BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS: AFRO-AMERICAN FOLK THOUGHT

FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM (1977); JOHN W. BLASSINGAME, THE SLAVE COMMUNITY:
PLANTATION LIFE IN THE ANTEBELLUM SOUTH (rev. ed. 1979).
86 PARISH, SLAVERY, supra note 36, at 68.
87 See ELKINS, SLAVERY, supra note 40, at 246-47; PARISH, SLAVERY, supra note 36, at

70.
88 ELKINS, SLAVERY,

supra note 40, at 130. See also

AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 11.
89 ELKINS, SLAVERY, supra note

MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY

40, at 130. See also id. at 53-54.
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never showed any inclination to rehabilitate it." 90 As an example,
Elkins referred to family disruptions within the domestic slave
trade. Elkins noted that "the contempt in which respectable society held the slave trader, who separated mother from child and
husband and wife, is proverbial in Southern lore. On the face of
things," he suggested, "it ought to have been simple enough to
translate this strong social sentiment into the appropriate legal enactments." 91 Ultimately, though, Elkins argued that the supreme
importance of the slave master's absolute property right could not
admit such a limitation. He explained that "the very nature of the
plantation economy and the way in which the basic arrangements
of Southern life radiated from it, made it inconceivable that the law
should tolerate any ambiguity, should the painful clash between
humanity and property interest ever occur." 92 Elkins regarded
"American slavery ...

[as] a system conceived and evolved exclu-

sively on grounds of property," and as between the slave as person
or as the master's property, Elkin's argued that property set the
terms of the debate and was always paramount. Elkins wrote that
"the law could permit no aspect of the slave's conjugal state to
have an independent legal existence outside the power of the man
who owned him." 93

After discussing the relationship between slave families and
the master's property rights, Elkins considered other legal categories that might have impinged on the master's property. He turned
to what he termed "matters of police and discipline."'94 In the application of criminal laws to slaves, Elkins found confirmation of
his thesis. Elkins observed that "here again what impresses us is
not the laxity with which much of the daily discipline was undoubtedly handled, but rather the completeness with which such questions, even extending to life and limb, were in fact under the
master's dominion." 95
Elkins next turned to restrictions upon a master's treatment of
slaves. Here, he noted that "[t]he law deplored 'cruel and unusual
at 53.
91 Id. Recently, Michael Tadman has shown that this proverbial view of slave traders is
unsupported by Southern slave-selling practices. Slaveholders were willing and active participants in the slave trade. See MICHAEL TADMAN, SPECULATORS AND SLAVES: MASTERS,
TRADERS, AND SLAVES IN THE OLD SOUTH 111-12 (1989). In a forthcoming article, I show
that the default rules at court sales maximized slave family disruptions. See Russell, Arti90 Id.

cles Sell Best Singly, supra note 20.
92 ELKINS, SLAVERY, supra note 40, at 53.
93
94
95

Id. at 54.
Id. at 56.
Id.
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punishment.' 9 6 But again, Elkins argued that such a limitation on
the master's authority amounted to nothing, because "it was practically canceled ... by the universal prohibition in Southern law
against permitting slaves to testify in court, except against each
other."97 As well, Elkins noted that judges "generally accepted the
principle that the line between correction and cruelty was impossible to determine. '98 Elkins found the master's dominance to be
complete in spite of the criminal prohibitions against mistreatment.
"Even the murder of a slave found the law straining all its resources to avoid jurisdiction," he concluded. 99 "In general," Elkins
found that "the court's primary care-not only in the killing of
slaves by persons other than the master but also in cases where the
slave himself had committed murder and was executed by the
state-was for the pecuniary interest of the owner." 100 Stampp had
found the master's property to be nearly absolute and, like Elkins,
had also catalogued the reasons for the reduced impact in practice
of laws that protected slaves' well-being. But Elkins insistently
strove to eliminate any qualification on the absoluteness of the
master's entitlement. He denied effect to expressions of state intrusion into the relationship of a master to his slave. "In the slave
system of the United States-so finely circumscribed and so
cleanly self-contained-virtually all avenues of recourse for the
slave, all lines of communication to society at large, originated and
ended with the master," Elkins wrote.10 ' The system was absolute
and also closed, and law did not breach the system's boundaries
nor diminish the master's authority, which was grounded in an absolute right to property. For Elkins, only the slave's relationship to
the master mattered.
As between Elkins and Stampp, then, there was disagreement
as to the character of the slave master's property right and authority. But with regard to this particular part of their work, the difference was slight: absolute versus very nearly absolute. However,
the distinction did carry larger implications for their differing views
of the institution of slavery as a whole. Since the 1950s, these two
parameters of absolute and nearly absolute have bounded historians' differing views of slave property. At the same time, I believe
that historians' analysis of the dichotomy of property and person
96
97
98
99

Id.
Id. at 56-57.
Id. at 57.
Id. at 57-58.

100 Id.
101 Id. at 63.
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has been contained within the larger analytical framework formed
largely in response to Elkins's Slavery. For the most part, historians have been affirming and reaffirming the position that Stampp
took, but they have done so while focusing most of their intellectual energy on the recovery of the slave as a historical agent. The
character of slave property has not troubled most historians be-.
cause they have been more interested in slaves as agents. 10 2 One
consequence is that the minimal legal recognition afforded to the
slave as a person has come to look even smaller as our awareness
of the slave's activity and culture has grown.
I regard Stampp's idea of slave property as the dominant conception today. In his 1990 book Slavery and Freedom, for example,
Oakes reproduced this model of slave property. In the introduction, Oakes, who was Stampp's graduate student, revealed that he
uses "absolute" as a synonym for "private", when discussing property and also stated that he "regards [p]rivate property rights.., as
the Pandora's box of modem history, simultaneously unleashing
the permanent revolution of capitalism and the total subordination
of slavery.' 10 3 Oakes suggested that "the western concept of absolute property may well derive from the legal codification of the
slave's powerlessness beginning in the late Roman Republic."' 1 4 In
discussing the antebellum period, Oakes emphasized the absoluteness of Southern views of their rights, including their rights to
property. 10 5 He noted that "property rights define some of the limits beyond which one person may not interfere in someone else's
life. In capitalism, where those limitations are considerable,"
Oakes continued, "property rights are said to be 'absolute.1' 1 0 6 By
this, he means that a slaveholder held the absolute right to exclude
others from interfering with his or her slaves. Oakes joined his
discussion of the absolute character of property rights under capitalism to the specific case of slavery. "In a similar way," he wrote,
"the distinctive attribute of the master-slave relationship was that
no one outside of it could interfere with-the slave's total subordina102 See MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 2 ("The notion of
the person as property is so ethically repugnant that even scholars who mention the slave
as a 'thing' often drop it in order to get on to the ways law governed the slave as a
person.").
103 OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, supra note 1, at xii. See also id. at 43 ("The development of capitalism, while underway for hundreds of years, was not complete until 'absolute' property rights had fully replaced the feudal system, in which customary rights to the
use of land were held 'conditionally' by serf, lord, and ultimately the king.")
104 Id. at 5.
105 See id. at 70.
106 Id. at 71.
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tion to the master.' 10 7 He explained that "[j]ust as a piece of 'private property' was held beyond the reach of society by its owner,
so was the slave removed from society by his or her total subordi10 8
nation to the master.' 1
Oakes analyzed absolute property in a manner much like his
teacher Stampp. He commented that "the fact that slaves were 'totally' subordinate to the masters did not mean that the master's
power over the slave was absolute."' 1 9 Immediately following this
comment, Oakes examined restrictions that the state placed upon
the authority of the master. Just as Stampp recognized that the
state subtracted from the absolute power of the master, Oakes
noted that "the state formally (and the community informally) regulated the master's power in a variety of ways." 110 Oakes identified a number of different limits on the master's absolute authority
including the basic definition of who could be enslaved, as well as
other issues such as "whether and under what circumstances a
master could free a slave"; rules about the distribution of slaves
through inheritance; other rules that allowed the state to expropriate slaves under certain circumstances, as for example when the
master failed to pay taxes; and also requirements for humane treatment."' Oakes emphasized that these legal restrictions on the
master's authority did not liberate the slaves. He explained that
"[t]he fact that the master's power was less than absolute did not
imply that the slave's subordination was less than total."' 12 Unlike
Elkins and like Stampp, Oakes understood the legal restrictions as
having some effect. He concluded that "the law restrained the
slaveholders in important ways. 11 3 Oakes identifies this restriction of power as the intrinsic ambiguity of slave law." 4 Thus, like
Stampp, Oakes regarded property in slaves as short of absolute,
because limited by the state.
In addition to regarding property as nearly absolute, Oakes
also presented slave property as unified in the hands of one master.
Oakes regarded "total subordination to the master" as the "most
basic precept of human bondage. 11 5 Total subordination need not,
Id.
108 Id. See also id. at 4; ORLANDO PATTERSON, SLAVERY AND SOCIAL DEATH: A COM107

PARATIVE STUDY 6 (1982). Patterson is a Symposium participant.
109 OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM,

110 Id.
111 Id. at 157.
112 Id. at 158.
113 Id.

114 See id. at 159.

115 Id. at 138.

supra note 1, at 155.
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of course, imply the singularity of the dominating force. A simple
analogy illustrates this point. If twelve people simultaneously fire
semi-automatic handguns at you, changing the clips every fifteen to
twenty rounds, you may not be able to distinguish that from one
person firing an automatic weapon with, say, fifty rounds a second.
Either way, you are fully subordinate. Thus, if Oakes's emphasis
were upon the total subordination of the slave, this would not commit him to the position that there was a unitary dominator.
However, Oakes does take the position that total subordination and absolute power of a single master are correlates. Indeed,
for Oakes, this is a key point, one that he intends to make with his
title: Slavery and Freedom. As noted, he identified "total subordination to the master" as slavery's fundamental precept. However,
six pages after pointing to this precept, he wrote that "the essence
of slavery was not treatment at all but rather, the master's power
over the intimate details of slave life. 11 6 In his 1982 book, The
Ruling Race, Oakes wrote that "the most distinctive feature of
black slavery was the systematic effort to dehumanize the slaves by
treating them as property. 11 7 Although total subordination and
domination by one person need not necessarily be correlated, for
Oakes they are; he made this clear in both The Ruling Race and
Slavery and Freedom. Indeed, central to Oakes's analysis of slavery is that between each slave and his or her master, the relationship was total. In this way, Oakes's argument resembled that of
Elkins. Oakes explained what "it means to say that the slave's subordination to the master was total: the slave could form no work or
family relationships of which the master disapproved and which the
master could not dissolve. 11 8 Within the complete and closed relationship of each slave to one master, total subordination on one
side correlated with absolute domination on the other. In his text,
Oakes moved freely between a discussion of total subordination
and domination by one master, to whom he referred using a singular noun. On one side, he found the total subordination of the
slave, and on the other, the near absolute power of a master. So,
Oakes, like Stampp, presented slave property as both absolute or
nearly so. Stampp was not quite as clear on the singularity of the
dominator as was Oakes, because the "total" relationship between
a slave and the master was not central to Stampp's argument as it
was to Oakes's. It may well be that Stampp simply never consid116 Id. at 144.
117 OAKES, THE RULING RACE,

supra note 6, at 26.
supra note 1, at 4.

118 OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM,
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ered the question. Even so, neither Stampp nor Oakes appear to
have in mind the subordination of slaves to a group of different
persons who, considered together, hold a collective, nearly absolute property right in the slave. Thus, the property right that
Oakes and also, I believe, Stampp presented was one that was

nearly absolute and, at the same time, unified in the hands of a
single person.
The most famous historical example of the easy correlation between total subordination and the absolute power of a single

master is Judge Thomas Ruffin's opinion for the North Carolina
Supreme Court in State v. Mann.11 9 -In Mann, Ruffin wrote that
"[t]he power of the master must be absolute to render the submission of the slave perfect."' 0 This opinion and sentence are wellknown.' 2 ' Oakes quoted this famous sentence of Ruffin's just after
he wrote that "If]or Ruffin, tie owners' right to 'full dominion'
over the slaves was 'essential to their value as property.""' 122 Thus,
although Ruffin's opinion referred to absolute dominion rather
than absolute property, Oakes revealed that he regarded the two as
closely correlated, if not synonymous.
119 State v. Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
120 Id. at 266.
121 For example, Paul Finkelman includes State v. Mann in his casebook on slavery.
PAUL FINKELMAN, THE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE: A CASEBOOK 217-20 (1986).
In Judith K. Schafer's article, "Detailsare of a Most Revolting Character":Cruelty to Slaves
as Seen in Appeals to the Supreme Court of Louisiana, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1283, 1286
(1993), she refers to this opinion as "often quoted." The powerful sentence in which Ruffin expresses the need for absolute power by the master to render the submission of the
slave perfect also appears in Genovese's Roll, Jordan, Roll. GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN,
ROLL, supra note 35, at 35. Of Ruffin's opinion, Genovese writes: "Never has the logic of
slavery been followed so faithfully by a humane and responsible man." Id. Ruffin's sentence is quoted in full by Kermit Hall in his survey of American legal history. KERMIT L.
HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR:-LAw IN AMERICAN HISTORY 131 (1989). Other works that
quote Ruffin's sentence in full include: Paul Finkelman, Sorting Out Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
24 RUTGERS L.J. 605, 638 (1993); Alan Watson, Slave Law: History & Ideology, 91 YALE
L.J. 1034, 1043 (1982) (reviewing MARK TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY,
1810-60 (1981)); Akhil Reed Amar & Daniel Widawsky, Child Abuse as Slavery: A Thirteenth Amendment Response to Deshaney, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1370 (1992); and
Michael S. Ariens, Dutiful Justice, 22 ST. MARY'S L.J. 1019, 1031 (1991) (reviewing SHELDON NOVICK, HONORABLE JUSTICE: THE LIFE OF OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES (1989)).
One non-historian has quoted the sentence in two diverse contexts. See Reginald L.

Robinson, "The Other Against Itself': Deconstructingthe Violent Discourse between Korean
and African Americans 67 S. CAL. L. REV. 15, 115 (1993); and Reginald L. Robinson, The
Impact of Hobbes's Empirical Natural Law on Title VII's Effectiveness: A Hegelian Critique, 25 CONN. L. REV. 607, 628 (1993). In The Key to Uncle Tom's Cabin, Harriet
Beecher Stowe included a substantial amount of Ruffin's opinion. HARRIET BEECHER
STOWE, THE KEY TO UNCLE ToM's CABIN (Arno Press & The N.Y. Times 1968) (1854).
122 OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM,

supra note 1, at 160.
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Mark Tushnet, writing from a very different ideological perspective than either Stampp or Oakes, also presented slave property as both unified and absolute. In his 1981 book The American
Law of Slavery, 23 Tushnet, a Symposium participant, emphasized
the absolute authority of the slave master. Tushnet offered a Marxist analysis of slavery and argues that "[s]ocial relations in slave
society rest upon the interaction of owner with slave; the owner,
having total dominion over the slave, relates to the entire personality of the slave.' 1 24 Like Oakes, Tushnet stressed the totality of the
slave's relationship to the master. However, he emphasized the totality-perhaps more accurately, total-ness-of the owner/slave relationship in order to distinguish Southern society from the
bourgeois social order of the non-slave United States. 125 "Slave social relations are total," said Tushnet, "engaging the master and the
slave in exchanges where each must take account of the entire
range of belief, feeling, and interest embodied in the other ....126
Further, he explained that
[w]hen a slaveowner purchases a slave, he or she acquires, not
the use of the slave's labor power-not, that is, only part of the
slave's activities-but the slave's labor-all the activities in
which the slave engages. The fundamental social relation of
slave society is thus total, engaging the full personalities of the
slaveowner and the slave.' 27
The relationship, from Tushnet's perspective, was a reciprocal one.
By contrast, in bourgeois society-which for Tushnet did not include the antebellum South-Tushnet explained that "social relations are partial, requiring only that participants in a market
evaluate [workers'] general productive characteristics without regard to aspects of personality unrelated to production.' ' 128 So, like
Stampp and Oakes, Tushnet emphasized the absolute power of the
slave master. And, like Elkins and Oakes, Tushnet emphasized the
123 MARK V. TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY 1810-1860: CONSIDERATIONS
OF HUMANITY AND INTEREST
SLAVERY].

(1981), [hereinafter

TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW

OF

124 Id. at 6.
125 Tushnet shares Genovese's notion that antebellum Southern society was a
prebourgeois social order. See generally GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL, supra note 35;
EUGENE D. GENOVESE, THE WORLD THE SLAVEHOLDERS MADE: Two ESSAYS IN INTERPRETATION (1969).
126 TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY,
127 Id. at 33.

supra note 123, at 6.

128 Id. at 6. As I argue below, I believe that Tushnet is mistaken in his characterization
of Southern society. Slave property, as I demonstrate, took the form of the fragmented,
partial interests that Tushnet argues characterized bourgeois society.
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total, all-encompassing, reciprocal nature of the slave's relationship
to a single master.
Tushnet also noted that there were some limitations that the
state placed on the slave master's exercise of his property rights. In
a chapter entitled Social Control of the Master's Will,'29 Tushnet,
like Stampp and Elkins before him as well as Oakes after him, considered these limitations. Tushnet focused on the specific issue of
emancipation and looked at the restrictions that states placed on
masters who wished to free their slaves. Like Oakes, Tushnet identified these restrictions as contradictions in a society committed to
the total relationship of a master and slave. 130
In his 1992 book People Without Rights, Andrew Fede also
presented an analysis of slave property as unified although limited
by the state. 131 Like Stampp, Elkins, Oakes, and Tushnet, Fede analyzed restrictions on property in slaves as a tension between the
property right of the masters and the power of the state. Additionally, Fede, like numerous other scholars before him, considered the
person/property dichotomy. 132 However, with regard to this dichotomy, Fede moved toward the Elkins parameter and regarded
the property right of the master as more absolute than did Stampp.
Fede argued that "the logic of slave law was the logic of absolute
legal oppression of one person over another.' 1 33 Like Oakes, then,
Fede emphasized a single master's domination of the slave. Fede
concluded that the person side of the dichotomy was empty because any rights that slaves seemed to gain were hollow. These
rights, Fede believed, merely "legitimized the master's power over
the slave."' 134 Although Fede found slave rights to be empty, he
does find state restrictions on property and noted that
"[s]ometimes the law regulated the individual master's freedom to
treat his slaves as he wished to further salient social interests that
the courts and legislatures balanced against the individual master's
interests.' 1 35 So, although he found the personal protections afforded to slaves to be ineffectual or merely serving of the master's
interest, as did Elkins, Fede did find some content to the public
rights side of the restriction on slave property. Even so, Fede emphasized what he terms the "unlimited" power of the master over
129
130

Id. at 157-228.
See id. at 228.

131 FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS, supra note 20.

See id. at 6-9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 11.
135 Id. at 12.
132
133
134
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slaves. 136 So, like Stampp, Oakes, and Tushnet, Fede did admit to
some limitations on property. He also regarded the power of property as unified in the hands of one holder. Fede thus fell somewhere between Elkins and Stampp in terms of the absoluteness
with which he regards slave property.
The time has come to look more closely at the property side of
the dichotomy of person and property. The dominant view today
of slave property as absolute and also as unified in the hands of a
single holder is, I believe, partly a consequence of the continuing
use of the dichotomy of person and property within the research
agenda formed as a response to Elkins's Slavery. While historians
have recovered evidence of the agency of slaves, they have left in
place a view of slave property as absolute or near absolute and, at
the same time, unified in the hands of a single holder. As I will
show below, closer examination of the evidence available to historians reveals that historians have misconceptualized slave property. In commenting on property, scholars have wrongly assumed
that owners of slaves possessed unified authority over their slaves.
In the conclusion to his massive and impressive new book, Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619-1820, published after this paper was
first presented at this Symposium, Thomas Morris commented on
historians' conceptions of slave property. Morris referred specifically to Oakes, Tushnet, and Fede as well as to Eugene Genovese
and Elizabeth Fox-Genovese. Morris concluded that these historians' "interpretations suffer from the assumption that slaveowners
throughout the South possessed some kind of absolute property in
their slaves and implicitly that such absolute claims were necessary
to uphold a slavery system.' 1 37 Morris acknowledged that there
are examples of judges referring to absolute ownership, but he labels such statements "hyperbole."'13 8 He suggested that historians
have confused statements about absolute power by the master-as
in Ruffin's opinion in Mann-with absolute property held by the
master. 139 Oakes, as I showed above, specifically translated Ruffin's sentence into absolute property. But Morris disposed quickly
of the claim that absolute property in slaves existed in the nineteenth century by offering, in a few sentences, two examples of the
less-than absolute character of property in slaves during the nine-

136

Id. at 17.

137 MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW,
138 Id.

139 See id.

supra note 20, at 430.
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teenth century. 140 In many respects, the remainder of this piece is
an elaboration of Morris's point.
III. A NEW

CONCEPTION OF SLAVE PROPERTY

As I noted in the introduction, I believe that historians should
reorient their view of property away from the absolute and unified
conception that Morris and I believe so many historians have in
their heads. Instead, they should reenvision property in slaves as
an aggregate of different legal relationships, each of which might
be called property. Contrary to the absolute or nearly absolute vision that predominates in historical writing today, the historical evidence shows that property in slaves took a fragmented form, with
different aspects of property divided among different non-slave
persons. My argument that historians should not think of slave
property as absolute and unified and should instead conceive of
property as fragmented in character should be familiar to today's
lawyers. In law schools, teachers of the course called "Property"
lead first-year students through an odyssey during which the students are supposed to shed a view of property as a unified and
absolute power over a thing, place, or building. The goal is for
students to accept in place of that view a new conception in which
property is not absolute but instead fragmented in such a way that
many different people may hold varying non-absolute
legal entitle141
property.
called
be
may
which
of
one
any
ments,
Historians interested in slavery now need to take the same
conceptual journey that lawyers made in their Property courses.
Historians come to the problem of property in slaves with the idea
that property in slaves was an absolute, unified right to the slave.
For the most part, historians appear to have adopted this idea of
property without conscious deliberation. This idea of absolute
property is one that law professors sometimes associate-inaccurately, as it turns out-with William Blackstone, the greatest eighteenth-century English writer on law.142 In his Commentaries,
Blackstone wrote that
[t]here is nothing which so generally strikes the imagination and
engages the affections of mankind as the right of property; that
sole and despotic dominion which one man claims and exercises
See id. at 431.
See, e.g., JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY (3d ed. 1993).
142 On Blackstonian absolutism with regard to real property, see Robert C. Ellickson,
Property in Land, 102 YALE L.J. 1315, 1362-63 (1993).
140
141
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exclusion of the
over the external things of the world, in total
1 43
universe.
the
in
individual
other
any
of
right

In place of this Blackstonian trope, historians of slavery should
substitute what legal scholars call a Hohfeldian concept of property, after Wesley N. Hohfeld, a law professor at Stanford and later
Yale, who lived from 1879 to 1918.144
With specific regard to property, there are three parts to
Hohfeld's theory, two of which are important for the present purposes. 145 The first of these two ideas has come to be known by the
shorthand expression bundle of rights or sometimes by the metaphor "bundle of sticks," although Hohfeld did not originate the
phrase. 46 Hohfeld instead regarded property as a divisible collection of legal entitlements: a bundle of sticks rather than a giant log.
The second important idea is that property is not a relationship
between a property holder and a thing that is the object of property, but instead property is the relationship between all the differ47
ent people who have legal claims on the object of the property.
Property, then, is the relationship between the various holders of
the sticks within the bundle. 148
Substitution of Hohfeld's concept of property for the absolutist trope opens the possibility of moving to a clearer understanding of the nature of slave property. Given the centrality of the idea
of property to the institution of slavery in the United States, understanding property would seem to be an important part of comprehending the institution. Gaining a clearer view of this fundamental
143 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES. In a chapter titled The Illusion of Absoluteness, Mary Ann Glendon writes that "Blackstone's flights of fancy about property as
absolute dominion stuck in American legal imaginations more than his endless boring
pages on what property owners really may and may not do with what they own." MARY
ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL DISCOURSE 43
(1991).
144 On Hohfeld's career, see MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870-1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 315 n.92 (1992).
145 See Wesley N. Hohfeld. Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE L.J. 710, 721 (1917); and Wesley N. Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal
Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L.J. 16 (1913). My concern here is
specifically with Hohfeld's ideas about property and not with his general model for analytical jurisprudence. On this model, see Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudencefrom Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 Wis. L. REV. 975, 986-994.
146 See Thomas C. Grey, The Disintegrationof Property, 22 NoMos 69, 81, 85 n.40
(1980).
147 See Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions, supra note 145, at 721.
148 The third idea, not important here, is that property need not be in a thing with physical existence. For a very helpful overview of Hohfeld's work, see Kenneth J. Vandevelde,
The New Property of the Nineteenth Century: The Development of the Modern Concept of
Property, 29 BuFF. L. REv. 325, 359-62 (1980).
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aspect of slavery by eliminating the trope and redefining the concept of property as a relationship among various people with legal
claims on the slave also offers the possibility of more insight into
the complicated relationships of both slavery and Southern society.
By conceiving of slave property as the aggregate of those legal relationships that constituted property in a slave, we can gain a better
sense of how the legal relationships of property distributed an interest in slavery among many different Southerners.
Among historians, slavery's role in holding Southern society
together remains an open subject. As Oakes noted in The Ruling
Race, after 1830, "[t]he percentage of slaveholding families in the
South was shrinking, and with increasing velocity in the 1850's.' 1' 49
In 1830, 36% of Southern families owned slaves. By 1850, the fraction dropped to 31%, and by 1860, just before the Civil War, the
fraction of slaveholding families in the South was down to about
one-quarter. 150 Historians have created varying aspirational and
hegemonic theories as to what kept the non-slaveholding
Southerners aligned with those who held slaves.15 1 Just what held
Southern society together during the antebellum years has proved
a durable puzzle. In this article, I do not propose to solve that
puzzle with a new conception of property, but I do believe that the
new idea of property that I posit offers fresh insight into how
Southerners shared a commitment and stake in the institution of
slavery.
IV.

FRAGMENTED PROPERTY IN SLAVES

Some examples will make clearer how Hohfeld's conception
of property applies to slavery. As noted, a number of these examples come from the works of those historians whose conception of
absolute or near absolute property I have outlined above. Once
again, my historiographical claim is not that historians have not
known about divided property interests in slaves, but rather my
claim is that historians have conceived of property in absolute
terms, despite evidence to the contrary.
A.

Estates

One way that property rights in slaves were commonly divided
into differing entitlements that different persons held was the sys149 OAKES, THE RULING RACE, supra note

6, at 229.

150 Id.
151 For an overview of some of these theories, see PARISH, SLAVERY, supra note 36, at

124-48.
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tem of estates. 152 A simple example is the creation of a life estate.
Most commonly, a life estate was created by the writer of a will.
The will writer specified that upon his or her death, a slave or
group of slaves should descend to a particular person, who, for the
rest of his or her life, would have the use of the slave or slaves. To
hold a life estate in slaves meant that the holder could manage the
slaves during his or her lifetime, but when the holder of the life
estate died, the remainder of the life estate would pass to the person whom the testator had specified to receive the remaindertoday, this person is called the remainderperson.
Stampp offered an example of the creation of life estates in
The PeculiarInstitution. Stephen Taylor, a North Carolina testator,
directed in his will that his wife have the use of five slaves during
her life, "after which they were 'to be sold and the money arising
therefrom to be equally divided' among several heirs.

' 153

Taylor's

widow thus held a life estate in the five slaves. Instead of directing
that the slaves descend to his heirs after she died, Taylor ordered
their sale and the distribution of the proceeds to the heirs. The
creation of a life estate by a slaveholding testator thus created at
least two persons with non-absolute legal claims on the slave.
These claims consisted of the present possessory interest known as
the life estate and a future interest known as the remainder.
In his 1848 pamphlet, The Negro Law of South Carolina,

South Carolina appellate justice John Belton O'Neall provided a
hypothetical example involving a life estate in slaves.

54

In his dis-

cussion of the maxim partus sequitur ventrem, O'Neall discussed
the application of the principle that the offspring will follow the
condition of the mother to situations in which the property interest
in slaves was divided into a life estate and a remainder. He explained that "[t]he owner of the mother has the same right in her
issue, born while she belongs to him, which he has in her.' 1 55 For

example, he noted that if "the person in possession is tenant for
life, then such an one takes an estate for life in the issue. "156
O'Neall also described the entitlement of the remainderperson.
152 On estates in slaves, see
at 85-88.

MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, supra note 20,

153 STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 205 (quoting from the 1848
will of Stephen Taylor, Edgecombe County Will Books, North Carolina Department of
Archives and History, Raleigh, North Carolina).
154 JOHN B. O'NEALL, THE NEGRO LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 17 (Columbia, South
Carolina, John G. Bowman 1848).
155 Id. at 17.
156 Id.
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He indicated that "the remainder man is entitled to the issue, 1on
' 57
the falling in of the life estate, as he is entitled to the mother.'
So, following the death of the life estate holder, the remainderperson received both the mother and the children.
O'Neall based his discussion of life estates and remainders on
cases adjudicated in South Carolina's appellate courts. 158 In Ellis v.
Shell, an 1815 case that he cited, the contested issue was just who
was entitled to possession of slave children born to a mother whom
a widow held as part of a life estate. 159 John Ellis wrote a will in
1772 in which he left to his wife, Mary, his "stock of horses, cattle,
hogs and household goods, debts, and a still, during her life," with
the remainder to his children. 60 He also bequeathed to Mary a life
estate in "one negro woman slave, named Peg.' 161 Ellis directed
that following his widow Mary's death, Peg should descend to his
daughter, Jane Ellis. While Mary held the life estate in Peg, "Peg
had considerable increase.' 1 62 Just how many children Peg had,
the report of the case does not indicate, nor is there any mention of
the children's father. Following Mary's death, her son John challenged his sister Jane and her husband Stephen Shell's entitlement
to Peg's children. He complained that he should get a share of the
children, just as he was entitled to a share of what remained of the
livestock, household goods, and still. At trial, the chancellor-this
was an action in equity-disagreed with John Ellis and awarded
Peg's children to John's sister Jane and her husband, and on appeal, four chancellors affirmed the decree below. 163 According to
O'Neall's explanation then, each of the children born to Peg during
the period when the widow Mary was still alive entered the world
as property fragmented between the life 64estate holder Mary and
the remainderperson, her daughter Jane.
As Ellis v. Shell suggested, the simple example of a life estate
in a slave could quickly yield complicated interpersonal relations.
Between John and his sister Jane there must have been tension.
157

Id.; see also MORRIS,

SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW,

FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS,

158

supra note 20, at 89-93;

supra note 20, at 230-31.

O'Neall cited Ellis v. Shell, 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) 611 (1815); Geiger v. Brown, 15 S.C.L.

(4 McCord) 418 (1828). Each case involved a grant of a life estate in slaves.
159 4 S.C. Eq. (4 Des.) at 611.
160
161
162
163
164

Id. at 612.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 612-13.
Stampp notes that "[tlhe offspring of slave women were frequently devised before

they were born-occasionally before they were conceived."
TION, supra note 27, at 205.
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Add to this conflict between siblings Jane's husband Stephen Shell,
who, when he married Jane acquired through coverture all of the
property interest she had in Peg and her children.165 After John
and Jane's mother died, these tensions emerged as litigation over
who would get control of Peg's children.
Imagine another scenario: a man specifies in his will that his
widow would hold their slaves for life, and following her death, the
remainder would go to their son. Suppose further that following
the husband's death, the widow manages her slaves rather harshly.
For example, she might direct her overseer to beat the slaves upon
little provocation, or she might provide them with inadequate food
and shelter. She might provoke the slaves sufficiently that they are
tempted to run away. Her son watches with interest. He knows
that when his mother dies, the slaves become his. He may disapprove of her management techniques and fear that her mistreatment of the slaves will permanently harm them, thereby reducing
the value of his future interest. He may fear that the slaves will run
away, thereby eliminating the value of his remainder. The son may
resent his mother; he might even wish her dead so that he can gain
control of the property.
This tension between the holder of a life estate and a remainder is one that lawyers technically call waste. A remainderperson
may claim that the holder of the life estate is mismanaging and
therefore wasting the property. In the context of slavery, the most
frequent case of this type involved situations where the life estate
holder sold his or her interest to another person. As with other
partial property interests, a life estate in a slave was alienable,
meaning that it could be sold. Indeed, partial interests in slave
property were also subject to execution, levy, and sale by a sheriff.
For example, in an 1857 Kentucky case, a sheriff executing a creditor's judgment levied upon and sold an undivided, one-half interest
in the remainder of a group of slaves. The slaves were held as a life
estate by the testator's widow. Following her death, the slaves
were to be divided between the testator's son and the children of
his daughter. The sheriff levied upon and sold at auction the son's
undivided, one-half interest in the remainder of the slaves. 166 In
such a sale, the buyer would take whatever interest the son pos-

165 On this point, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 208 (2d
ed. 1985); MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA
14-18 (1986).
166 See Bums v. Ray, 57 Ky. (18 B. Mon.) 392, 399-404 (1857).
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sessed. If the son held a life interest, for example, then the buyer's
interest in the slave would end when the son died.
Problems arose when the buyer of the life estate, or someone
to whom this buyer resold, purported to sell the entire property
interest in the slave. For example, in 1826, the justices of the South
Carolina Court of Appeals sorted out a transaction that began with
a pre-nuptial agreement that Thomas and Judith Swan had executed in 1801.167 The agreement provided that if Thomas died
before Judith, she would take a life interest in two slaves, with the
remainder to Judith and Thomas's children, if any, otherwise to
Thomas's children from his first marriage. 168 Sometime following
her husband's death, Judith sold her interest in the slaves to
Thomas Ligan who understood that he only purchased a life estate,
as measured by her life. But Ligan then sold the slaves to Thomas
Rudd and represented to Rudd that he owned the complete property interest in the slaves, not merely the life estate. These transactions made Thompson Swan, the remainderperson, anxious, and he
sought an order from the equity court requiring the delivery of the
slaves to him. Barring that, he asked the chancellor to order
Thomas Rudd and Thomas Ligan to account for the slaves' value
and also asked the chancellor to remind Rudd and Ligan that on
Judith's death their property interest would terminate. The defendants demurred to this complaint, which demurrer the chancellor overruled. The defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals,
which heard appeals both at law and in equity. 169 The justices confirmed that the anxious remainderperson might seek equitable relief when concerned that the life estate holder was diminishing the
value of the estate.' 70 The justices also noted that
it is clear, that one who purchases a life estate, with a full knowledge of the existence of a deed by which the remainder is vested
in a particular individual, becomes thereby a trustee for such
remainder man, and might, under circumstances, be required to
give security for the forthcoming of the property. 17 '
Just as the life estate holder was responsible to the remainderpersons, so were those who purchased life estates. Again, the owners
articulated their relationship through the slaves, with each possessing a legal and financial interest in the slaves. The Court of Ap167
168
169
170
'71

See Swan v. Ligan, 12 S.C.L. (1 McCord) 227 (1826).
See id. at 228.
See id. at 230.
See id. at 232.
Id. at 231.
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peals ordered that Ligan and Rudd answer the remainderperson's
172
complaint and directed that the case be tried in the court below.
Particularly vexing were cases in which slave traders
purchased slaves subject to life estates and took them out of the
state. The Tennessee Supreme Court considered such a case in
1845. In King v. Sharp, a widow had sold slaves in whom she held
1 73
a life estate to Sharp, after informing him of her limited estate.
He then resold them "to a negro-trader who removed them beyond
the limits of the State. 1 74 After the widow's death, the
remainderpersons, who were the testator's children, filed a bill in
equity, in which they sought to have Sharp deliver the slaves or pay
their value. 75 As in South Carolina, the Tennessee justices affirmed that the life estate holder had a responsibility to the
remainderperson. Justice Green wrote that "every owner of a life
estate, either in land or slaves, is quasi trustee for the remaindermen."' 176 He noted that were the rule otherwise, "[t]he temptation
to commit frauds of this kind would be often seized with avidity by
the owner of the life-estate, and the purchaser might easily put the
negroes beyond the reach of the remainder-man, by their removal
and sale. ' 177 As Sharp had done just that, the justices held that he
which he could not do, or compenshould either deliver the slaves,
178
sate the remainderpersons.
As suggested in the hypothetical situation involving the son
and his mother, waste cases might involve the issue of the slave's
treatment or management. Whether a life estate holder's treatment of a slave was improper was a more difficult issue to adjudicate than the question of whether the life estate holder had sold
the slave into the interstate slave trade. In Worthington v. Crabtree, a Kentucky case, remainderpersons with an interest in the
slave Henry brought suit in order to force the sale of Henry, so that
they might share in the proceeds of the sale. 179 The remainderpersons were the daughters of Isaac Crabtree, who had devised Henry
in his will. Their husbands joined them as complainants. 180 They
complained that Colston Crabtree, who had purchased the life in172

See id. at 233.

173 King v. Sharp, 25 Tenn. (6 Hum.) 55 (1845).
174 Id. at 55.
175
176

Id.

Id. at 57 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 58.
Id. See also Coffey v. Wilkerson, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 101 (1858); Bonner v. Bonner, 26
Tenn. (7 Hum.) 436 (1846); Lewis v. Kemp's Executor, 25 N.C. (3 Ired.) 233 (1845).
179 Worthington v. Crabtree, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 478 (1858).
180 Id. at 479.
177
178
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terest, was managing Henry in such a way that his value was declining and that Henry might succeed in escaping, thereby defeating
their remainder entirely. The opinion does not make clear how
Colston Crabtree was related to the sisters; he may have been a
brother or an uncle.
What to modern eyes may be a bit surprising is that the sisters
complained not that Henry was being treated poorly but rather
that Colston Crabtree was too lenient with the slave. Judge Stites's
opinion for the court revealed that Colston Crabtree
had sold Henry his own time; had been contracting with him as
[a] free man; was permitting him to go at large and make trades
for himself; did not keep or pretend to keep him in subjection,
and was in various ways indulging him to an extent well calculated to render8 him insubordinate and valueless to the
remaindermen.1 1
The sisters alleged that "the slave was ungovernable and insubordinate in his temper; was about to run away to a free state,
and unless sold, would prove a total loss to the owners. ' 182 In
short, after treating Henry much like a free black, the
remainderpersons despaired of forcing Henry to be subordinate in
a manner befitting a slave. Without specifically mentioning it, the
sisters may have been concerned that the mismanagement of
Henry would lead to his contracting drapetomania, one of the diseases that Louisiana's Dr. Samuel W. Cartwright identified as peculiar to blacks. 83 Drapetomaniawas "the disease causing negroes
to run away" and lax treatment could be among its causes." The
a
sisters had special reason to fear Henry's departure; fie lived in185
River,
Ohio
the
by
only
Ohio
from
Kentucky County separated
the river across which Eliza escaped to freedom in Uncle Tom's
Cabin.186
The judges of the Kentucky high court agreed with the sisters.
"Such conduct towards a slave was not only incompatible with and
destructive of the interest of the remaindermen," Justice Stites
wrote, "but in violation of law.' 1 87 With regard to the incompatibility of Henry's treatment with the interests of the sisters, the
judge offered a defense of slavery when he explained that
181 Id. at 481.
182 Id. at 480.
183 STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION,
184 Id. at 109.

supra note 27, at 102, 109.

185 Worthington v. Crabtree, 58 Ky. (1 Met.)
186 STOWE, UNCLE TOM'S CABIN, supra note
187

Worthington, 58 Ky. at 481-82.

478, 481 (1858).
3, at 111-12.
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"[s]ubordination is essential to the relation of master and slave,
and alike beneficial to both. It is difficult to conceive of any injury," he continued, "short of an entire destruction of the property,
more serious to the interests of the reversioners or remaindermen
in slaves than such treatment by the tenant for life." 18 8 He explained that the "inevitable tendency" of lenient mistreatment was
to "render them discontented, insubordinate, and disposed, whenever subjected to proper restraints, to seek such change of abode as
will restore to them their usual privileges.' 89
Judge Stites also mentioned that Colston Crabtree's lenient
treatment of the slave Henry was "in violation of the law." 190 In
particular, Stites referred to a Kentucky statute that regulated
holders of life estates in slaves. The statute, passed in 1852, protected the holders of remainders in slaves by regulating the activity
of the life estate holders and by requiring that they record their life
estates with the county clerk each year. The statute provided that
within the first sixty days of. each year,
[e]very owner of a slave, for his own or another's life, and the
guardian or husband of such owner, shall.., file with the clerk
of the county in which he resides a statement, in writing, of the
names, sex, and ages of such slaves, which shall be recorded at
the cost of the person in remainder, in a book to be kept for that
purpose. 19'
Such a record gaveslave buyers the opportunity to confirm that the
seller from whom they purchased possessed the legal entitlement
to sell more than just a life estate in a slave. As well, the statute
specified that if the life estate holder removed the slave from the
state without the permission of the remainderpersons, then the life
estate was to cease and the remainderpersons could then recover
the slave. 192 Finally, and most relevant for the purposes of the sisters interested in Henry, the statute provided that "[a] court of
chancery may, for good cause shown, compel the tenant or owner
of a life estate in a slave to give bond, with good surety, for the
forthcoming of the slave at the termination of the same.' 1 93 The
188 Id. at 482. Stites expanded his point to include reversioners, that is, grantors of partial interests to whom the property reverted after some period of time or after the occurrence of some event. The simplest, most relevant example of a reversion might be lessors
of slaves. After a lease concludes, the property reverts to the lessors. Stites's language was
thus a lesson to those who leased slaves to manage them with the requisite severity.
189 Id. at 482.
190 Id.
191 Ky. REV. STAT.
192 Ky. REV. STAT.
193

Id.

ch. 93, art. 1, § 7 (1860).
ch. 93, art. 1, § 9 (1880).
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sisters, alleging that Henry's lenient treatment was a "good cause"
under the statute, asked the Kentucky Chancery Court to order
Henry's sale, but if that were not possible, they requested that Colston Crabtree be ordered to post a bond.'
The appellate court
agreed that the sisters had shown "good cause," and they directed
195
the court below to order Colston Crabtree to post such a bond.
As Henry's actions suggest, the human character of the slaves
complicated the tangled relationships of property among the nonslaves. This is an obvious point. In the South Carolina case of Ellis
v. Shell discussed above, the relationship of the widow Mary to her
children John and Jane and to her son-in-law was articulated, in
part, through the objects of property: the slaves. With a life estate
in land, matters are less complicated. Land does not reproduce itself, and so the complication that O'Neall discussed regarding the
status of any children born during the period of the life estate
would not be one that the holder of a life estate in, say, New York
would have had to consider at the time. Another wrinkle was that
the slaves would likely be aware of their legal status, and they
would also likely have some feelings about the different persons
who might become their masters. As Frederick Douglass commented regarding the division of slaves for purposes of inheritance:
"The character and tendencies of the heirs, are generally well understood among the slaves who are to be divided.' 1 96 And sousing again the example of the widow and her son-the slaves
would know that when the widow died, they would pass to the control of the son. Whenever the demands of the widow and her son
differed, the slaves would face the difficult choice of whom to disobey. Knowing that they would eventually pass to the son would
cause them to want to remain on his good side. Another more
sinister turn might occur if the slaves anticipated their passage to
the remainderperson would improve their lives. If they sought to
escape the demands of the widow, then the slaves would have an
incentive to hasten the termination of her estate.
I concede that these examples-slaves killing a widow who
held them as a life estate in order to pass into the hands of the son,
and a son wishing his own mother's death in order to control slave
property-are unlikely. But, unlikely things happen in large populations, and there is a rather noteworthy historical example that
194 Worthington v. Crabtree, 58 Ky. (1 Met.) 478, 479 (1858).
195 Id. at 482.
196 OAKES, THE RULING RACE, supra note 6, at 177 (citing FREDERICK DOUGLASS, My
BONDAGE AND

My

FREEDOM

174-75 (1855)).
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closely resembles my imagined scenario in which slaves murder a
widow in order to pass to the remainderperson.
When George Washington wrote his will in 1799, there were
277 slaves at Mount Vernon.1 97 The former president owned 124
slaves, but a greater number of slaves, 153, were held by virtue of
dower rights that Martha Custis Washington derived from her first
marriage to Daniel Parke Custis. 198 The rights of dower were another manifestation of the less-than-absolute character of slave
property, and, in the states in which dower rights in slaves existed,
a woman was entitled to take either a life estate or a full interest in
one-third of her husband's slaves.' 99 Mr. Washington desired that
the Mount Vernon slaves be freed following his death, but, of
course, he did not have the legal power to free Martha's dower
slaves, nor could he free more than two-thirds of his own slaves,
since she had dower rights in these slaves as well, by virtue of her
marriage to him. As well, his slaves had formed families with
Martha's dower slaves. In his will, he explained that "[t]o emancipate them during her life, would, tho' earnestly wished by me, be
attended with such insuperable difficulties on account of their intermixture by Marriages with the Dower Negroes .
"..."20 So,
George instead bequeathed a life estate to Martha in his entire estate, with the provision that his slaves be freed at the time of her
death.2 o'
After Washington's death in December 1799, Martha became
anxious with so many slaves awaiting her death in order to become
free. After a visit to Martha a year after her husband's death, Abigail Adams reported that Martha told her that "she did not feel as
though her life was safe in their hands, many of whom would be
told that it was in her interest to get rid of her. ' 2°2 In effect, the
slaves who would receive freedom on her death occupied the position of remainderpersons. The remainder that they would receive
197 See MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 94.
198 See id. at 94. See also THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF GEORGE WASHINGTON
AND SCHEDULE OF HIS PROPERTY 30 n.1 (John C. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939).
199 See MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at

93-96. See also
141-60; William v. Kelly,
5 H. & J. 59 (Md. 1820); Brown v. Collins, 14 Ark. 421 (1854); Welch v. Cole, 14 Ark. 400
(1854); McCargo v. Callicott, 16 Va. (2 Munf.) 501 (1811).
SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY, supra note 165, at

200 FITZPATRICK, THE LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT OF GEORGE WASHINGTON,

supra

note 198, at 2.
201 See id.
202 MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW,

supra note 20, at 94 (quoting JAMES T.
393 (1974)).
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was their liberty. Mrs. Adams advised her to set the slaves free at
the end of the year.20 3
So, the testator's division of the property in slaves into just
two separate interests, a life estate and remainder, could create a
complicated web of relationships. Wills, dower, and prenuptial
agreements, the most important means of creating these two types
of estates, might place in conflict the different holders of non-absolute entitlements to the slaves. As well, the slaves, as the object of
the divided estates, may have experienced conflict in their own behavioral incentives -as they wondered whom to obey or, as with
George Washington's slaves, when their interests were at odds with
those of the life estate holder.
This simplest example of the division of the slave property into
two separate interests, can, of course, be made substantially more
complicated. A remainder might pass to more than one child, for
example, as it did in the Crabtree case. Two slaves might be the
property of the widow until her death, when they-would be divided
among her children. This division would likely require a court sale
of the slaves, so that the proceeds could be divided among the children. As well, all of the complicated estates and future interests
into which land might be divided-not merely the simple example
of a life estate and remainder-might also be applied to property
in slaves. A testator might specify that a slave would pass to a
particular person if a specified event were to come to pass-a marriage for example. If the marriage did not occur, then the slaves
would pass to some other person or back to the heirs of the grantor. As well, husbands sometimes specified that their widows' life
estates would terminate upon remarriage. °4

203 See id. at 94. Historians differ as to whether Martha Washington freed her slaves as
Abigail Adams suggested,, although there is a consensus among historians that Martha
Washington died a natural death. For accounts that indicate that she did free the slaves,
see id. at 94; JAMES T. FLEXNER, WASHINGTON: THE INDISPENSABLE MAN 393 (1974);
JAMES T. FLEXNER, GEORGE WASHINGTON: ANGUISH AND FAREWELL (1793-1799), at
446-47 (1972). By contrast, the following historians believe that she did not free the slaves.
See Philip J. Schwarz, George, Washington and the Developing Law of Slavery, Paper
Presented at the Conference on "Slavery in the Age of George Washington" (Nov. 1994)
(A copy of which is on file with the author.); EUGENE E. PRUSSING, THE ESTATE OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON, DECEASED 158-59 (1927).
204 See MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 86-87. See also
Lewey v. Lewey, 34 Mo. 367 (1864).
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B.

Leasing

Leasing was yet another way to divide an interest in property,
whether real estate or slaves.2z 5 Slave leasing, or hiring, as it was
more commonly called, might take place for a variety of reasons.
As Genovese notes, the
slaves came from relatives of deceased slaveowners, who were
settling the estate; from authorities who were sorting out a
bankruptcy; from mobile planters who were setting up new plantations and needed time to get ready for a full work force; and
from settled planters who had bought a large group of slaves
and could not absorb it immediately. 06
At the end of the lease period, the lessor once again, regains her
full'interest in the property. As'anyone who has ever been either a
landlord or a tenant knows, the incentives of the lessor (landlord)
and lessee (tenant) are not congruent. The lessor wants the property to remain in good condition so that the property continues to
produce income with future leases, while the lessee may care only
that the property continue to exist through the period of the leasehold. With the leasing of a slave, this divergence of interests could
lead to a situation where the lessee of the slave attempts to work
the slave so hard that the slave is debilitated, thereby creating a
conflict between the lessor and lessee.
State v. Mann, the 1829 North Carolina case that historians
often discuss, displayed how the interests of the lessor and lessee of
a slave might diverge.2 0 7 The case involved the slave Lydia, whom
John Mann had hired for a year from Elizabeth' Jones. At some
point during the year, Lydia, according to the court's opinion,
"committed some small offence, for which the Defendant undertook to chastise her. ' 20 8 Lydia then "ran off, whereupon the Defendant called upon her to stop. '20 9 Oakes noted that "[w]e cannot0
'21
say why Lydia ...refused to accept her master's punishment.
He wondered whether "she had been abused too often before; per205 On leasing, see MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 13258; OAKES, THE RULING RACE, supra note 6, at 40; RICHARD C. WADE, SLAVERY IN THE
CITIES: THE SOUTH 1820-1860, at 38-54 (1964); Randolph B. Campbell, Slave Hiring in
Texas, 93 AM. HIST. REV. 107, 114 (1988).
206 GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL, supra note 35, at 391. Administrators were under
a duty to hire out slaves. See Welch v. Cole, 14 Ark. 400 (1854); Henderson v. Renfro, 31
Ala. 101 (1857); Wilson v. Barnett, 9 G. & J. 158 (Md. 1837); Hall v. Griffith, 2 H. & J.483
(Md. 1809); Cross v. Cross, 45 Va. (4 Gratt.) 257 (1848).
207 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263 (1829).
208 Id. at 263.
209 Id.
210 OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 137.
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haps," he speculated, "she had one of those 'saucy' dispositions of
'
which so many slaveowners complained."211
We may also wonder,
along with Oakes, where she was running? Was Lydia hoping to
reach Elizabeth Jones, the lessor, in order to articulate her concerns about her treatment at the hands of John Mann, the lessee?
If so, her physical flight would have traced the lines of the legal
relationship between Jones and Mann. But, Mann stopped that
tracing with a gunshot that wounded her.212
In his opinion in State v. Mann, Ruffin did not resolve nor go
into detail regarding the relationship between Lydia's lessor and
lessee. Near the beginning of the opinion, Ruffin did note that the
lessee of a slave did not occupy a position of exclusive authority
over the slave. He wrote that "[in a criminal proceeding, and indeed in reference to all other persons but the general owner, the
hirer and possessor of a slave, in relation to both rights and duties,
is, for the time being, the owner. ' 213 By general owner, in this instance, Ruffin had in mind Elizabeth Jones, the lessor. Ruffin did
not delve into the details of the relationship between Jones and
Mann, and Tushnet suggested that "[t]his passage indicates that
Southern slave law did not at that time support a differentiated
analysis of the various relationships among members of slave soci'
ety."214
About this Tushnet may have been right, but the failure of
appellate justices to work out the doctrinal implications of the fragmented relationships of slave property does not, of course, mean
that these relationships did not exist.
The frequency of slave hiring meant that the sorts of conflicts
that led to State v. Mann-conflicts between lessee and slave, but
also conflicts between lessor and lessee-could become common.
Genovese estimated that "between 5 and 10 percent of the slaves
in the South could expect to be hired out any given year in the late
antebellum period. '215 Morris reported that the figure might be as
high as fifteen percent.21 6 Tensions between lessors and lessees
must have grown right along with the increase in the proportion of
leased slaves. In 1857, Tennessee's high court justices noted that
211 Id.
212 Mann, 13 N.C. (2 Dev.) 263.
213 Id. at 265 (emphasis added).
214 TUSHNET, THE AMERICAN LAW OF SLAVERY, supra note
215 GENOVESE, ROLL, JORDAN, ROLL, supra note 35.

123, at 63.

216 See MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 132. Oakes concluded that "[w]here the purchase price was too high, slave rental was sometimes easy
enough to make the use of such labor far more common than ownership statistics indicate,
indeed close to universal in parts of the black belt." OAKES, SLAVERY AND FREEDOM,
supra note 1, at 105.
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"[o]ne of the great dangers to the owners of slaves is the recklessness and wanton disregard, on the part of hirers, of the safety of
' 217
the slave and the interests of the owners.

Hiring, then, was another example of the non-absoluteness of
slave property and also of the way that slave property was not consolidated in the hands of a single person. The incidence of hiring
alone means that somewhere from one-in-twenty to one-in-seven
slaves were not held as absolute property. Add to this fraction
those slaves divided into life estates, remainders, and other estates,
and the empirical extent of the fragmentation of legal property begins to become apparent. And, of course, hiring might be combined with other limited estates, as for example where the lessor of
the slave holds a limited estate. Perhaps Elizabeth Jones was a
widow with a life estate in Lydia. If so, then there may also have
been remainderpersons interested in the shot that John Mann fired
into Lydia.
C. Finance

Finance also divided property interests in slaves. As is wellknown to historians of slavery, slaves were the subject of mortgages in Southern states.218 Broadly speaking, with a mortgage, the
borrower-called the mortgagor in this context-grants to the
lender or mortgagee an interest in the collateral.219 In the event
the borrower fails to make repayment, the mortgagee forecloses
and either takes possession of the property or directs that the property be sold. With a mortgage, the mortgagee has an interest in
being something of a busybody with regard to the property that
serves as the collateral. Today, for example, banks want to be sure
that you insure your house so that if the house happens to be destroyed by a tornado, for example, there will be enough insurance
217 James v. Carper, 36 Tenn (4 Sneed) 398, 403 (1857). Morris also quotes this part of
the opinion. See MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 137.
Work injuries involving hired slaves could raise the thorny issue of the fellow servant rule's
application. See id. at 148-58. See also Paul Finkelman, Slaves as Fellow Servants: Ideology, Law, and Industrialization,31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.269 (1987).
218 See MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 96-99; Thomas D.
Morris, "Society is not marked by punctuality in the payment of debts": The Chattel Mortgages of Slaves, in AMBIVALENT LEGACY: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE SOUTH 147-70
(David J. Bodenhamer & James W. Ely, Jr. eds., 1984). For cases, see Chapman v. Turner,
5 Va. (1 Call) 280 (1798); Bird v. Wilkinson, 31 Va. (4 Leigh) 266 (1833); Strider v. Reid, 43
Va. (2 Gratt.) 38 (1845); Lobban v. Garnett, 39 Ky. (9 Dana) 389 (1840); and Hart v. Burton, 30 Ky. (7 J.J. Marsh.) 322 (1832).
219 For greater detail concerning mortgages, see MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY AND THE
LAW, supra note 20, at 121-31.
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money to repay the loan. Thus, through the object of the mortgage, the homeowner-mortgagor and the lender-mortgagee are
linked, with each holding a non-absolute property interest. Mortgages of slaves created the same monitoring incentive for the mortgagee. The mortgagee of a slave would want to be sure that the
mortgagor managed the slaves in such a way that they would continue to be valuable if the mortgagee were to foreclose.
Mortgages were useful but also somewhat ungainly. One difficulty was the burden of recording the mortgage in one or more
state or county offices. 220 As with the recording of life interests,
recording of mortgages served the function of providing notice-or
the possibility of notice-to all interested parties that the property
interest in the collateral was divided between the mortgagee and
the mortgagor. In 1845, South Carolina lawyer David McDowell
explained the details of becoming a mortgagee to his client, Mrs.
Elizabeth Calmese Kincaid, following the death of her husband.
"A mortgage of land," he explained, "must be recorded in the register's office, that is the clerk's office of the District where the land
lies." With "personal property"-meaning slaves-he noted that
recording was necessary in the "District where the debtor2 2resides,
and also in the Secretary of State's office within 60 days." ' So, if
Mrs. Kincaid, as creditor, required a debtor to give her a mortgage
on a slave, in order to protect her interest in the collateral, she
would have to file that mortgage in two offices, whereas with land
she only had to file once.
Another important aspect of mortgages was that the effect of
the mortgage was limited to specific property. David McDowell
explained to Mrs. Kincaid that "a mortgage binds only the particular property specified in the mortgage. ' 222 This limitation was particularly important in the context of slavery. The mortgaging of
slaves presented difficulties different from mortgages of houses or
land. Houses are only rarely mobile, and land moves only according to geologic time. But slaves were notably mobile. For example, mortgagors might take their slave property and escape to
Texas. 2 3 Or, the property might take themselves away from both
mortgagor and mortgagee. Because a mortgage gave the creditor
access only to the specific collateral named in the mortgage, land
220
221

See Morris, Chattel Mortgages of Slaves, supra note 218, at 155-56.
Letter from David McDowell to Elizabeth Calmese Kincaid (Oct. 3, 1845), in The

KINCAID-ANDERSON PAPERS
222 Id.
223

See, e.g.,

(South Caroliniana Library, University of South Carolina).

STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION,

supra note 27, at 203.
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and sessile propeity like houses and buildings posed fewer risks to
mortgagees.
The inconvenience of recording and the specificity of a
morta
different
use
to
client
his
to
advise
gage's coverage led McDowell
financing device, one that fragmented property in slaves in a more
general way than did mortgages. McDowell recommended that
Kincaid instead secure from her debtors a confession of judgment.
By this he meant that she should, when making a loan, also file
paperwork in the courthouse as if she were suing the debtor. As a
condition of extending credit, Kincaid could insist that the debtor
confess judgment to the suit. Kincaid, in turn, would agree not to
complete the execution of the judgment unless the debtor defaulted. The advantage of this method, as McDowell explained,
was "that the judgment and the lodging of an execution [would]
bind all the defendant's property within the state. ' 224 As a creditor, Kincaid would prefer this general lien to the specificity of the
mortgage.225
CONCLUSION

Considered together, estates in slaves, leases, mortgages, and
liens show the relational quality of slave property. 26 The use of
these different legal forms demonstrates that the Hohfeldian conception of property as neither absolute nor unified applies to property in slaves. Absolute property in slaves, unified in the hands of
a single holder, may have been an aspiration of some slaveholders
and jurists, in the same way that absolute, despotic, and exclusive
property had struck the imagination and engaged the affections of
humankind in the eighteenth century, when Blackstone wrote. But
absolute and exclusive do not describe the practice of property
224 Letter from David McDowell, supra note 221.

225 See Russell, Sale Day in Antebellum South Carolina, supra note 24, at 181-83.
226 There are other ways in which slave property might exist in fragmented form. Trusts
are an important example. In a trust, the trustee holds legal title of the property and often
controls it, acting for the benefit of the benefactors. See MORRIS, SOUTHERN SLAVERY

AND THE LAW, supra note 20, at 88-89. Trusts were especially important as a way for
married women to have property held separately for them. See SUZANNE LEBSOCK, THE

1784-1860,
at 57-67, 77 (1984).
Slave warranties provide another example of how property interests joined together
non-slaves in legal relationships articulated through the slaves. On slave warranties, see
Andrew Fede, Legal Protection for Slave Buyers in the US. South: A Caveat Concerning
Caveat Emptor, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 322 (1987); Judith K. Schafer, "GuaranteedAgainst
the Vices and Maladies Prescribed by Law": Consumer Protection, the Law of Slave Sales,
and the Supreme Court in Antebellum Louisiana, 31 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 306 (1987); Gross,
supra note 68.
FREE WOMEN OF PETERSBURG: STATUS AND CULTURE IN A SOUTHERN TOWN,
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holding in slaves. Hohfeld's conception of property as a relationship between persons, rather than as a relationship between a person and a thing, better describes slave property. In the context of
slavery, though, holders of property also had human relationships
with the objects of the property. The slaves, as objects of property,
were surrounded by a web of legal interests or rights that tethered
together non-slave parties. The slaves were fully subordinate to
those non-slave parties, and they faced the very difficult task of
sometimes being forced to negotiate among the different non-slave
parties who made demands upon the slaves.
I have argued that a conception of slave property as absolute
(or nearly so) and exclusive has also struck the imaginations of historians of American slavery for at least the past forty years.
Although historians have been familiar with evidence showing that
property in slaves was fragmented, they have nonetheless continued to characterize slave property as absolute and unified. This
was true in the great work of Kenneth Stampp and has remained
true in more recent works by Tushnet, Oakes, Fede, and others. I
suggest that historians should reorient their idea of slave property
so that the conception aligns with the evidence. Quite simply, my
proposal is that historians reconceive slave property along
Hohfeldian lines. This means that historians should think of property as a bundle of sticks rather than a giant log. Of the historians
whom I have considered in this piece, Fede came closest to stating
this conception, when he noted that "[a]s a species of property, the
slave represented the embodiment of the 'bundle of rights' possessed by the master. 22 7 Unfortunately, although Fede adopted
the bundle of sticks metaphor, he missed the importance of the
metaphor by having the master possess the bundle. The importance of the bundle of sticks metaphor as a shorthand for understanding part of Hohfeld's theory about property is that different
persons may hold the different sticks. If one person holds them all,
the bundle may as well be a log.
This new conception of slave property as a fragmented relationship among a series of non-slaveholders contradicts the absolute and nearly absolute views of property of Stampp, Elkins,
Oakes, and Fede. But, the new conception is most fully at odds
with Tushnet's ideas regarding Southern society. As described
above, Tushnet believed that in a slave society, social relationships,
especially the relationship of a master to a slave, are total and reciprocal, whereas in bourgeois society, he regards social relation227 FEDE, PEOPLE WITHOUT RIGHTS,

supra note 20, at 34.

SLAVE AUCTION

1996]

ships as partial and fragmented. Along with Elkins, Oakes, and
Fede, Tushnet emphasized the total and reciprocal relationship of
the dominating master with the subordinated slave. My argument
is that the nature and practice of slave property in Southern society
disrupts the totalizing frame that Tushnet and the others posit, and,
more particularly, that slave property, as a social relationship
among non-slaves, matched Tushnet's conception of bourgeois society. As with property in non-slave jurisdictions at the time, slave
property was fragmented and alienable. To be sure, there were
sometimes contradictions between the commands of the state and
the desires of slave masters. Both Oakes and Thshnet emphasize
these as intrinsic contradictions in Southern slave society. There
were also conflicts between "considerations of humanity and interest"-to use the words of Thshnet's subtitle-a conflict that is, as
Fede noticed, a "variation[ ] of the person/property definitions of
the non-Marxist.

' 228

Ultimately, though, the intrinsic contradiction of property that
beset Southern society was the same contradiction of the non-slave
United States. When Justice Shaw approved the Commonwealth
of Massachusetts's limitation of a wharf owner's extension into
Boston Harbor, the wharf owner encountered the limits on the exercise of property in society. 229 Limits on economic competition, as
Holmes would demonstrate in Privilege, Malice, and Intent, also
bumped against the right of property. 230 The contradiction that
Tushnet and Oakes emphasize regarding Southern society was the
same conflict that Duncan Kennedy labeled the "fundamental contradiction" in his analysis of Blackstone's Commentaries.23' As
well, humanity and economic interest collided when: New England
milldam owners closed the gates of their dams and flooded the land
of their upstream neighbors, 232 the proprietors of the Warren

Bridge began construction of the bridge that would compete with
and destroy the value of the Charles River Bridge,233 and railroads
scarfed up privately held real property using eminent domain pow-

228 Id. at 8.
229 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
230 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1894).
231 Duncan Kennedy, The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries, 28 BuFF.L. REV. 205
(1979).
232 See HORWITZ, supra note 144, at 34-53.
233 See STANLEY I. KUTLER, PRIVILEGE AND CREATIVE DESTRUCTION: THE CHARLES
RIVER BRIDGE CASE (1971).
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ers.234 Slave property was another of the varied forms of American
property in which property holders sometimes experienced the
contradiction between their dynamic ambitions and the limits that
other members of society imposed upon them through the intervention of the state. Like other forms of property in the United
States, slave property was a social relationship among those who
held the varied entitlements called property.
The new image of the slave auction is of slave sales on the
courthouse steps conducted by legal officials in front of the community, with everyone-bidders, spectators, legal officials, and
slaves-linked by a web of legal relations called slave property.
Because slave property was a social relationship, the social ritual of
the slave auction represented perfectly Southern commitment to
slavery as a social, economic, and legal institution. The fragmented
character of slave property distributed the direct stake that antebellum Southerners had in slave society beyond those who managed or held possessory interests in slaves to anyone with future or
other non-possessory interests, including those that resulted from
credit relationships.
By 1860, there were fewer than 385,000 owners of slaves
among-the eight and one-quarter million free persons in the South:
a slave-owning rate of under five percent.235 Historians have become accustomed, though, to describing slave ownership in terms
of the fraction of Southern families that held slaves: about onequarter.in 1860.236 By altering the demographic expression of slave
ownership-switching from ownership by individuals to familieshistorians offer a clearer picture of the extent of Southern commitment to the institution. Oakes has added an economic angle to this
elucidation of the stake that Southerners had in slavery. To the
fraction of Deep South families that held slaves, Oakes adds those
who moved "into and out of the slaveholding class," those who
hired slaves, and those "who, by virtue of their education or family
background, had every reason to expect that within a few years
they would own slaves. 12 37 While acknowledging that "it is impossible to arrive at any accurate figures," Oakes guesses "that for
234 See Harry N. Scheiber, The Road to Munn: Eminent Domain and the Concept of
Public Purpose in the State Courts, in LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY (Donald Fleming &
Bernard Bailyn eds., 1971).
235 STAMPP, PECULIAR INSTITUTION, supra note 27, at 29-30 & n.8.
236 Id. at 30; see JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 123 (7th ed. 1994); OAKES, THE RULING RACE,
supra note 6, at 40.
237 OAKES, THE RULING RACE, supra note 6, at 40.
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most of the antebellum era, a clear majority of white families in the
Deep South had a direct material interest in the protection and
perpetuation of slavery. 2 38 To these demographic and economic
techniques for expressing the extent of the material stake in the
institution of slavery, I add a new image of slave property. Understanding slave property in terms of the fragmented, partial relationships that constituted property in slaves offers another way to
understand how Southerners were linked together by and therefore committed to the institution of slavery. The slave auction was
an important icon in part because, as Oakes suggested, the auction
reinforced the subordination of slaves. The slave auction symbolized the subordination of slaves as persons and also symbolized the
wide distribution of the power of subordination through the fragmentation of property in slaves. The slave auction is linked to a
new conception of slave property as a social relationship because
divided ownership interests in slaves triggered many sales. The
auction was also a powerful symbol because the ritual affirmed the
centrality within Southern society of slave property as a social relationship among non-slaves.
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Id. at 41.

